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FOR CAUSE: RETHINKING RACIAL EXCLUSION
AND THE AMERICAN JURY
Thomas Ward Frampton*
Peremptory strikes, and criticism of the permissive constitutional framework
regulating them, have dominated the scholarship on race and the jury for the
past several decades . But we have overlooked another important way in
which the American jury reflects and reproduces racial hierarchies: massive
racial disparities also pervade the use of challenges for cause . This Article examines challenges for cause and race in nearly 400 trials and, based on original archival research, presents a revisionist account of the Supreme Court’s
three most recent Batson cases . It establishes that challenges for cause, no less
than peremptory strikes, are an important—and unrecognized—vehicle of
racial exclusion in criminal adjudication .
Challenges for cause are racially skewed, in part, because the Supreme Court
has insulated the challenge-for-cause process from meaningful review . Scholars frequently write that jury selection was “constitutionalized” in the 1970s
and 1980s, but this doctrinal account is incomplete . In the interstices of the
Court’s fair-cross-section, equal protection, and due process jurisprudence,
there is a “missing” law of challenges for cause . By overlooking challenges for
cause, scholars have failed to notice the important ways in which jury selection remains free from constitutional regulation .
Challenges for cause as they exist today—effectively standardless, insulated
from meaningful review, and racially skewed—do more harm than good .
They hinder, more than help, the jury in its central roles: (1) protecting the
individual against governmental overreach; (2) allowing the community a
democratic voice in articulating public values; (3) finding facts; (4) bolstering
the perceived legitimacy and fairness of criminal verdicts; and (5) educating
jurors as citizens . We need to rethink who is qualified to serve as a juror and
how we select them .
* Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. This project benefited
tremendously from feedback received during the Climenko “Half-Baked” Workshop, the Colorado Junior Criminal Law Workshop, CrimFest 2019, and several additional talks; many
thanks to the participants and organizers. I’m indebted in particular to Valena Beety, Jon
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Jeff Adelson, Gordon Russell, and John Simerman) and American Public Media (particularly
Will Craft). Many thanks to my research assistants—Zachary Buchanan, Madeleine O’Neill,
and Gege Wang—and the team of editors with the Michigan Law Review.
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INTRODUCTION
Peremptory strikes, and criticism of the permissive constitutional
framework regulating them, have dominated the scholarship on race and the
jury for the past several decades. 1 The standard critique is well known: Bat-

1 . See, e .g ., Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1989); Jeffrey Bellin &
Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More than the Unapologetically Bigoted
or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (2011); Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutors and Peremptories, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1467 (2012); Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine:
The Supreme Court’s Utter Failure to Meet the Challenge of Discrimination in Jury Selection,
1999 WIS. L. REV. 501; Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives
and Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279 (2007); Vida B. Johnson, Arresting
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son v . Kentucky 2 notwithstanding, prosecutors in jurisdictions across the
United States continue to wield peremptory strikes to exclude black prospective jurors at a rate far exceeding their elimination of other groups. 3 Causal
explanations for these disparities vary—they may stem from overt racial discrimination, 4 or attorneys’ implicit biases, 5 or the disparate effect of “raceneutral” criteria that correlate with race 6—but the figures are troubling re-

Batson: How Striking Jurors Based on Arrest Records Violates Batson, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
387, 414 (2016); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson from the Very Bottom of the Well: Critical Race
Theory and the Supreme Court’s Peremptory Challenge Jurisprudence, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71
(2014); Nancy S. Marder, Batson Revisited, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1585 (2012); Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683 (2006) [hereinafter Marder, Justice Stevens]; Theodore McMillian & Christopher J. Petrini, Batson v.
Kentucky: A Promise Unfulfilled, 58 UMKC L. REV. 361 (1990); Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in
Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 447 (1996); Camille A. Nelson, Batson, O .J ., and Snyder: Lessons from an Intersecting
Trilogy, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1687 (2008); Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate
Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099 (1994); William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient, 1987 SUP. CT. REV.
97; Anna Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness: Reversing a Peremptory Trend, 92 WASH. U. L. REV.
1503 (2015) [hereinafter Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness]; Anna Roberts, Disparately Seeking
Jurors: Disparate Impact and the (Mis)use of Batson, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1359 (2012) [hereinafter Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors]; Ronald F. Wright et al., The Jury Sunshine Project:
Jury Selection Data as a Political Issue, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1407, 1431; Joshua Revesz, Comment, Ideological Imbalance and the Peremptory Challenge, 125 YALE L.J. 2535 (2016); Note,
Judging the Prosecution: Why Abolishing Peremptory Challenges Limits the Dangers of Prosecutorial Discretion, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2121 (2006).
2. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3. For empirical studies documenting this phenomenon, see David C. Baldus et al., The
Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 3 (2001); Ann M. Eisenberg et al., If It Walks like Systematic Exclusion and
Quacks like Systematic Exclusion: Follow-Up on Removal of Women and African-Americans in
Jury Selection in South Carolina Capital Cases, 1997-2014, 68 S.C. L. REV. 373 (2017); Ann M.
Eisenberg, Removal of Women and African Americans in Jury Selection in South Carolina Capital Cases, 1997-2012, 9 NE. U. L.J. 299 (2017); Thomas Ward Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71
VAND. L. REV. 1593, 1627 (2018); Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy:
The Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina
Capital Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531 (2012); Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused
of Race or Gender Discrimination? Some Data from One County, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695,
697 (1999); Billy M. Turner et al., Race and Peremptory Challenges During Voir Dire: Do Prosecution and Defense Agree?, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. 61 (1986); and Wright et al., supra note 1.
4 . See, e .g ., Frampton, supra note 3, at 1627 (highlighting “reasons to suspect that the
more overt variety of racially motivated exclusions—the narrow type of racially discriminatory
action Batson aimed to ferret out—also remain common”).
5 . See, e .g ., Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2010).
6 . E .g ., Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors, supra note 1; Wright et al., supra note 1, at
1431 (“It is also possible that prosecutors removed jurors based on a factor correlated with
race . . . . Prosecutors might have been fully aware of the disparate racial impact of these choices and regretted that unintentional side effect of their removal strategy.”). For a notable recent
attempt to prohibit the use of justifications for peremptory strikes that highly correlate with
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gardless. 7 There is now a broad scholarly consensus that Batson has failed to
meaningfully limit systemic racial exclusion in jury selection. 8 And, to Batson’s most strident critics, studies documenting wide racial disparities in the
use of peremptory strikes have validated the argument (urged by Justice
Thurgood Marshall and others) that only by abolishing peremptory strikes
can we purge the taint of racial bias from jury selection. 9
Our myopic focus on peremptory strikes, however, has led to the neglect
of an adjacent problem: equivalent racial disparities pervade the exercise of
challenges for cause. Challenges for cause and peremptory strikes differ in
important respects, of course. First, challenges for cause ostensibly “permit
rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified . . . and legally cognizable basis of
partiality”; 10 peremptory strikes generally require no justification (unless
they are contested, at which time the proponent’s “implausible[,] fantastic[,]
silly or superstitious” rationale may suffice). 11 Second, challenges for cause
must always be approved by a judge; unless subject to a Batson challenge,
peremptory strikes receive no such scrutiny. And third, peremptory strikes
are limited in number by statute; a party may raise challenges for cause
against every single potential juror, should they wish. But despite these differences, challenges for cause resemble peremptory strikes in one important
respect: they both disproportionately reduce black jurors’ participation on
criminal juries. If the well-documented disparities in how legal actors exercise peremptory strikes are cause for concern (and they are), the existence of
similar disparities in the use of challenges for cause should also set off alarm
bells.
Yet too often, challenges for cause are treated as an afterthought. Like
peremptory strikes, challenges for cause have a venerable common law pedigree, 12 and the Supreme Court often mentions them in passing. 13 But the

prospective jurors’ race, see WASH. GEN. R. 37(h) (declaring “presumptively invalid” rationales
like “expressing a distrust of law enforcement” for exercising a peremptory strike).
7. Ronald Wright, Opinion, Yes, Jury Selection Is as Racist as You Think . Now We Have
Proof ., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/04/opinion/juries-racism
-discrimination-prosecutors.html [https://perma.cc/39XZ-G8N7] (discussing “especially pernicious effects” of racial disparities “even [if it remains impossible] to say exactly why a prosecutor, defense attorney or judge decides to remove any particular juror in a single case”).
8 . See supra notes 1, 3. But cf . Jonathan Abel, Batson’s Appellate Appeal and Trial
Tribulations, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 713 (2018) (acknowledging “Batson’s failings as a trial doctrine—its inability to prevent and remedy strikes in real time—but . . . focus[ing] [on] Batson’s
virtues in appellate and postconviction proceedings”).
9 . See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266–67 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing empirical studies as bolstering Justice Marshall’s argument for the abolition of peremptory strikes); see also Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial
Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 809–10 (1997) (discussing the problems with peremptory challenges from the perspective of a trial judge).
10. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
11. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995).
12 . See 3 EDWARD COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *447–504 (J.H.
Thomas ed., Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1826) (1644); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
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Court has established few rules governing when jurors may or must be excused “for cause”: “Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of
mind. For the ascertainment of this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down no particular tests and procedure is not
chained to any ancient and artificial formula.”14 Scholars, too, have shied
away from the topic15: the leading treatise on the “law of juries” devotes seven pages to challenges for cause and seven times that to peremptory strikes.16
The profound ways in which race shapes the process of “qualifying” the
American jury has been overlooked and undertheorized.
This Article’s central claim—that black jurors’ “qualifications” for jury
service, or lack thereof, operate as an important instrument of racial exclusion today—situates the present moment within a broader historical narrative. For over a century, both state and federal actors justified the exclusion
of black jurors from criminal trials, in whole or in part, on the grounds that
few possess the requisite objectivity (e.g., “sound judgment and fair character”17) to serve. Traditionally, this exclusion occurred when officials developed lists of prospective jurors from which individual trial venires were
randomly drawn.18 The ostensible lack of “qualified” black jurors has been
invoked since black jury service began in the middle of the nineteenth century;19 it remained a common refrain until the 1970s, when Congress20 and the

COMMENTARIES *342–44 (endorsing Coke’s categories). Importantly, however, at common law
the grounds for excluding prospective jurors “for cause” were far narrower than they are today.
See G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Death of Death-Qualification, 59 CASE W. R ES. L.
REV. 87 (2008) (detailing development of death qualification of American juries); infra Section
III.C.
13. See, e.g., Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2019) (“The attorneys may
challenge prospective jurors for cause, which usually stems from a potential juror’s conflicts of
interest or inability to be impartial.”).
14. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 386 (2010) (quoting United States v. Wood,
299 U.S. 123, 145–46 (1936)).
15. NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 94 (2007)
(“How often people are removed for cause has not been extensively studied.”); Mary R. Rose &
Shari Seidman Diamond, Judging Bias: Juror Confidence and Judicial Rulings on Challenges for
Cause, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 513–14 (2008) (“The judge’s behavior in making these decisions [on challenges for cause] has been almost entirely ignored by researchers, while other
forms of judicial behavior have attracted substantial recent attention from scholars.”).
16. Compare NANCY GERTNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JURIES §§ 3:4–:7 (10th ed. 2018),
with id. §§ 4:1–:32.
17. See, e.g., Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 588 (1896).
18. See infra Section II.A.
19. Histories of the American jury uniformly report that “the first African-Americans
ever to serve on a jury in America were two who sat in Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1860.”
Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United
States, 61 U. CHI. L. R EV. 867, 884 (1994); see also JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 2 (1994)
(“No African-American served on any trial jury in the United States, North or South, until
1860 during a criminal trial in Worcester, Massachusetts.”); Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging
the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory
Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 31 (1990) (“Moreover, despite the de jure eligibility of many
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Supreme Court 21 began insisting that jury pools comprise a “fair cross section” of the community. 22 But, through challenges for cause, the practice
subtly continues: in courtrooms across America today, prosecutors allege
(and judges confirm) that black jurors remain less “qualified” than white jurors to participate in an institution frequently touted as central to American
democracy.
Part I reveals the stark racial disparities in how challenges for cause are
wielded. Sections I.A and I.B provide an empirical examination of how prosecutors and defense attorneys exercise challenges for cause by analyzing 317
criminal jury trials in Louisiana and 74 criminal jury trials in Mississippi.
Prosecutors overwhelmingly use such challenges to exclude black jurors. The
racial disparities documented in the prosecutors’ exercise of challenges for
cause actually exceed the sizeable disparities in their use of peremptory
strikes in both datasets. Then, to demonstrate how these general trends play
out in individual cases (and to highlight our relative blindness to the phenomenon), Section I.C offers a revisionist account of the Supreme Court’s
three most recent cases involving racial discrimination in jury selection:
Flowers v . Mississippi (2019), 23 Foster v . Chatman (2016), 24 and Snyder v .
Louisiana (2008). 25 In each case, the Court took pains to parse prosecutors’
justifications for using peremptory strikes against individual jurors, seeking
to ascertain whether racial bias infected those decisions. But a return to the
original trial records—including full voir dire transcripts and handwritten

qualified black people, northern juries remained all-white prior to 1860.”); James Forman, Jr.,
Essay, Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century, 113 YALE L.J. 895, 910 (2004) (“It is believed
that 1860 was the first year in which African Americans served on juries, in either the North or
the South.”). Research for this Article has revealed at least one prior instance: a prominent Buffalo, New York abolitionist named Abner H. Francis served as a petit juror for a term in 1843.
The unusual occurrence was noted in newspapers around the country. See, e .g ., A Colored Juryman, MILWAUKIE SENTINEL, Oct. 7, 1843, at 1 (“This is the first instance of the kind, we believe which has ever occurred in this country.”); A Negro Juryman, BATON ROUGE GAZETTE,
Sept. 30, 1843, at 2. The existence of (limited) black suffrage before the Civil War, see
CHRISTOPHER MALONE, BETWEEN FREEDOM AND BONDAGE: RACE, PARTY, AND VOTING
RIGHTS IN THE ANTEBELLUM NORTH (2008), and laws enacted to prohibit black citizens from
serving as jurors, see FRANK U. QUILLIN, THE COLOR LINE IN OHIO: A HISTORY OF RACE
PREJUDICE IN A TYPICAL NORTHERN STATE 23 (1913) (discussing 1831 Ohio law barring black
jurors), suggest there may have been earlier examples.
20. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 53 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1869 (2018)).
21. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
22 . See, e .g ., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 357 (1970) (noting that 171 of the 178 potential grand jurors struck from master list “either because of their being unintelligent or because of their not being upright citizens” were black); cf . South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 312–13 (1966) (“The good-morals requirement [for voter registration] is so vague
and subjective that it has constituted an open invitation to abuse at the hands of voting officials.”).
23. 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019).
24. 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).
25. 552 U.S. 472 (2008).
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attorney notes that were not before the Supreme Court—offers a much richer story. In each trial, challenges for cause, not peremptory strikes, eliminated most of the black prospective jurors and enabled the empaneling of an allwhite (or nearly all-white) jury.
Part II weighs various explanations for these disparities and explains
why they have remained hidden: existing constitutional doctrine offers little
opportunity to contest what occurs at the challenge-for-cause stage of jury
selection. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Court assertively “constitutionalized” important parts of the jury selection process: the drawing of jury venires and the exercise of peremptory strikes became subject to Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment regulation, respectively. 26 But the Court’s simultaneous retreat from the regulation of challenges for cause—beginning just a
week after the Court’s landmark 1986 ruling in Batson v . Kentucky—has escaped notice. In cases involving the scope of the Sixth Amendment’s faircross-section requirement, 27 the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause, 28 and the relationship between peremptory strikes and challenges for
cause, 29 the Court quietly foreclosed criminal defendants’ ability to meaningfully contest the challenge-for-cause process (and, in particular, the disproportionate removal of black jurors through such challenges). Jury selection
might look very different—and the massive disparities identified in Part I
might not exist—had the Court not ruled as it did.
Part III appraises challenges for cause as they exist today—and, relatedly, the contemporary vision of the “qualified” juror—in light of the traditional roles of the jury, the data presented in Part I, and the legal landscape
outlined in Part II. The Framers, the Supreme Court, and legal scholars have
defended and celebrated the jury as an institution that (1) protects the individual against governmental overreach; 30 (2) allows the community a democratic voice in articulating public values; 31 (3) finds facts; 32 (4) bolsters the
perceived legitimacy and fairness of criminal verdicts; 33 and (5) educates jurors as citizens. 34 On each of these fronts, today’s challenges for cause—
effectively standardless, insulated from meaningful review, and racially
skewed—do more harm than good. We should rethink who is qualified to
serve as a juror and how we select them.

26 . See Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945, 946–47 (1998) (“The Supreme Court has had more to say
about who sits on criminal juries in the last twenty years than it did in the previous 180.”).
27 . Infra Section II.A.
28 . Infra Section II.B.
29 . See infra Section II.C.
30 . See infra Section III.A.
31 . See infra Section III.B.
32 . See infra Section III.C.
33 . See infra Section III.D.
34 . See infra Section III.E.
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RACIAL EXCLUSION AND CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE

In study after study, scholars have shown that there are stark racial differences in whom prosecutors and defendants exclude through peremptory
strikes. 35 But, unnoticed, 36 the same racial discrepancies that have been documented in the use of peremptory strikes exist in the use of challenges for
cause, as well.
In this Part, I analyze data on race and the jury from Louisiana and Mississippi, and I reconstruct the trial record in the three most recent Supreme
Court cases involving claimed Batson violations. In both Louisiana and Mississippi, teams of investigative journalists working on independent awardwinning projects recently compiled a wealth of information on state-court
criminal jury trials. 37 Much of these journalists’ source material, including
digital scans of court records and trial transcripts, is now available to the
public and to researchers; it provides the basis for the analysis in Sections I.A
35 . See supra note 3.
36. There has been little empirical work done on challenges for cause, but a few exceptions warrant mention. Two studies of peremptory strikes have shown that challenges for
cause—taken as a whole—can distort the racial composition of the venire. The earliest examined thirteen felony trials involving 348 prospective jurors within a single North Carolina
county. See Rose, supra note 3. The author found that black jurors were moderately overrepresented among those prospective jurors eliminated for cause: they made up 32% of prospective
jurors and 38% of those excused for cause. Id . at 698. In a far more ambitious study involving
more than 1,300 felony trials and almost 30,000 prospective jurors, a group of scholars recently
collected trial data for an entire year’s worth of trials throughout North Carolina. Wright et al.,
supra note 1. They found that judges removed black prospective jurors “for cause” 30% more
frequently than white jurors (and judges removed “other” nonwhite jurors 110% more frequently than white jurors). Id . at 1426.
Relatedly, there have been several studies examining how the process of “death qualification” skews the racial composition of jury pools in capital cases. Professor Aliza Cover, for example, recently examined transcripts from eleven trials in Louisiana that resulted in a death
verdict between 2009 and 2013. See Aliza Plener Cover, The Eighth Amendment’s Lost Jurors:
Death Qualification and Evolving Standards of Decency, 92 IND. L. REV. 113 (2016). In the seven trials for which the race of the prospective jurors was available, 35.2% of black prospective
jurors were excluded on the basis of their opposition to the death penalty. A much smaller percentage (17%) of white jurors were removed on this basis, making the pool of eligible jurors
significantly whiter than it would have otherwise been. Id . at 137. See also Justin D. Levinson et
al., Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six
Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513 (2014).
37. Both efforts received the George F. Polk Award in Journalism in 2019; the Louisiana
project also won a Pulitzer Prize for Local Reporting. See Eileen Sullivan, New York Times
Wins Two George Polk Awards, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019
/02/19/us/politics/george-polk-awards.html [https://perma.cc/KW9V-MH24] (discussing Polk
Award for American Public Media’s investigation in Mississippi); Staff Report, The Advocate
Honored with George Polk Award for ‘Tilting the Scales’ Series on Split Jury Verdicts,
ADVOCATE (Feb. 19, 2019, 12:14 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/busi
ness/article_23f6b76a-3472-11e9-928d-2f446b73d815.html [https://perma.cc/5AKG-Q7VL];
Staff Report, The Advocate Wins First Pulitzer Prize for Series that Helped Change Louisiana’s
Split-Jury Law, ADVOCATE (Apr. 15, 2019, 2:15 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton
_rouge/news/article_dba87282-5f28-11e9-92b3-bfba0cf08ab2.html [https://perma.cc/BL8RE4D6].
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and I.B. In Section I.C, public records requests, visits to courthouse storage
rooms, and the assistance of local trial attorneys supplied what was missing
from the Supreme Court record: full voir dire transcripts and information
sufficient to identify the race of (the vast majority of) prospective jurors. 38
A. Louisiana
Over several years, investigative journalists in Louisiana examining the
effect of nonunanimous verdicts 39 compiled a dataset (“the RussellSimerman dataset”) containing information from over 3,000 criminal jury
trials conducted across Louisiana from 2009 to 2017. 40 For 316 jury trials, the
dataset includes the race of (nearly) all jurors in the initial venire; the party
responsible for successful challenges for cause; the party responsible for peremptory strikes; and the race of the empaneled jurors.
The dataset provides an unprecedented look at how deeply entwined
race and challenges for cause are. In total, 14,616 prospective jurors were
members of the initial venire for these 316 trials. While many of these jurors
were simply “surplus” jurors—never questioned or challenged because the
jury box was filled before they were needed—the racial demographics of this
initial venire serve as a baseline. Of the prospective jurors, 32.6% were black;
61.7% were white; and 3.6% were Asian, Hispanic, or “Other.” (Racial information was unavailable for 2.0% of prospective jurors.)

38. This information has been compiled in five appendices available for download
online. Thomas Ward Frampton, For Cause: Appendices, GOOGLE DRIVE, https://drive
.google.com/file/d/1x3piBF6dZwmKNnAjP-ow3YrOfFFK1AW2/view (on file with the Michigan Law Review). All of the data in Part I come from jurisdictions in the Deep South, and some
caution is therefore warranted in drawing generalizations based on the patterns identified; future research will have to determine whether equivalent racial disparities in the use of challenges for cause exist across the United States. But it is noteworthy that the racial patterns
identified in the use of challenges for cause in these jurisdictions match or exceed those involved in peremptory strikes. See infra Figures 2, 4. And there is good reason to believe that the
ongoing use of racially motivated peremptory strikes is not a regional phenomenon. See, e .g .,
State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 348 (Wash. 2013) (González, J., concurring) (“Peremptory
challenges are used in trial courts throughout this state, often based largely or entirely on racial
stereotypes or generalizations.”), abrogated by Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124 (Wash. 2017);
Baldus et al., supra note 3 (noting large racial disparities in use of peremptory challenges in
Philadelphia capital cases in 1980s and 1990s).
39 . See Frampton, supra note 3, at 1621.
40. For the collection methodology and raw data for the Russell-Simerman dataset, see
Jeff Adelson, Download Data Used in The Advocate’s Exhaustive Research in ‘Tilting the Scales’
Series, ADVOCATE (Apr. 1, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.theadvocate.com/new_orleans/news
/courts/article_6f31d456-351a-11e8-9829-130ab26e88e9.html [https://perma.cc/UEX3-B652].
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TABLE 1: RACIAL COMPOSITION OF INITIAL VENIRE (LOUISIANA)
Raw Number

Percentage

White

9,019

61.7%

Black

4,770

32.6%

Other Nonwhite

531

3.6%

Unknown

296

2.0%

Total

14,616

100.0%

If race and the exercise of juror challenges or strikes were not correlated,
the racial demographics of the challenged or struck jurors should match the
racial demographics of the initial venire. In other words, we would expect
roughly 62% of each party’s challenges for cause and peremptory strikes to
be directed at white jurors and 33% of challenges for cause and peremptory
strikes to be directed at black jurors.
Instead, prosecutors overwhelmingly used challenges for cause to exclude nonwhite jurors. Of 967 successful challenges for cause by prosecutors—the Russell-Simerman dataset does not include information on
attempted but unsuccessful challenges—58.9% of challenges (n = 570) removed black prospective jurors and only 34.4% (n = 333) removed white
prospective jurors. The discrepancies between the composition of the original venire and the jurors excluded “for cause” by prosecutors are depicted in
Figure 1.
FIGURE 1: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN PROSECUTORS’ USE OF CHALLENGES FOR
CAUSE (LOUISIANA)
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This means that prosecutors excluded black prospective jurors at 181%
of the frequency we would expect if race and challenges for cause were not
correlated and excluded white prospective jurors at just 56% of the frequency
we would expect. Comparatively speaking, these disparities mean that black
jurors were 3.24 times more likely than white jurors to be excluded by the
government “for cause.”
Notably, these disparities are even greater than the substantial racial disparities in the exercise of peremptory strikes in the same 316 trials. As with
challenges for cause, prosecutors used peremptory strikes to “overstrike”
black jurors and “understrike” white jurors, targeting the former group with
53.6% of their peremptory strikes and the latter with 40.5% of their peremptory strikes (despite the much larger number of white prospective jurors in
the initial venire). This is a sizeable departure from the expected percentages
if race were not correlated with the use of peremptory strikes: prosecutors
were 2.50 times more likely to use a peremptory strike against any given
black potential juror than any given white potential juror. But these disparities are still less dramatic than those involved with challenges for cause. A
comparison of the relative disparities appears in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN PROSECUTORS’ USE OF PEREMPTORY
STRIKES AND CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE (LOUISIANA)
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B. Mississippi
As part of a lengthy investigation into the many murder trials of Curtis
Flowers in central Mississippi, 41 American Public Media collected every
available jury trial record from Mississippi’s Fifth Judicial District (covering
seven counties) from 1992 to 2017. 42 Their inquiry focused on racial disparities in the use of peremptory strikes, 43 but helpfully, the nonprofit media organization made available to the public all of their raw source material. For
83 trials (involving 4,717 prospective jurors), full voir dire transcripts and
juror lists allow for an original analysis of racial disparities in the use of challenges for cause, as well. 44
The racial composition of the initial venire in Mississippi’s Fifth Judicial
District is roughly similar to that in Louisiana (although virtually all prospective jurors are either black or white). As before, these figures provide a
baseline for the expected challenge rates. If jurors’ race and challenges for
cause were not correlated, we would expect roughly 60% of each party’s challenges to be directed at white prospective jurors and roughly 34% to be directed at black prospective jurors.
TABLE 2: RACIAL COMPOSITION OF INITIAL VENIRE (MISSISSIPPI)
Raw Number

Percentage

White

2,823

59.8%

Black

1,614

34.2%

Asian

3

0.1%

Unknown

277

5.9%

Total

4,717

100.0%

The observed racial distribution of the actual challenges for cause, however, looked nothing like the expected results. Unlike in Louisiana, the trial
judge initiated the vast majority (n = 760) of challenges for cause; the common practice was for the judge to identify a potential for-cause challenge and
invite objections and argument from the parties. Those prospective jurors
41 . See Section I.C.1.
42 . In the Dark: S2 E8: The D .A ., APM REP. (June 12, 2018), https://www.apmreports
.org/story/2018/06/12/in-the-dark-s2e8 [https://perma.cc/F2BL-TXM9].
43 . Id .
44. For source notes and a full methodology of American Public Media’s study, see Will
Craft, Mississippi D .A . Has Long History of Striking Many Blacks from Juries, APM REP. (June
12, 2018), https://features.apmreports.org/in-the-dark/mississippi-district-attorney-strikingblacks-from-juries/ [https://perma.cc/S58H-9CGN]. Although APM’s dataset had ninety-one
cases, eight of its cases do not include all of the information needed to independently verify
and code who raised which challenge to each juror.
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first identified by the judges were disproportionately black: although white
jurors outnumbered black jurors by nearly two to one in the initial venires,
52.9% of the judge-proposed disqualifications were black jurors and 44.2%
were white jurors. In all 83 trials, prosecutors never once objected to the
judge-proposed dismissal of a black juror; in large part, it seems, prosecutors
seemed content to allow the judge to remove those whom they would have
targeted anyway. Defendants objected with more frequency to judgeproposed removals, and they did so roughly equally with black and white
nominees for exclusion. Defendant-initiated challenges (n = 128) and prosecutor-initiated challenges (n = 73) occurred much less frequently, but when
they occurred, the racial disparities were even more dramatic. Only 20.5% of
prosecutors’ challenges for cause were aimed at white prospective jurors,
while 79.5% of their challenges aimed to remove black prospective jurors.
Given their comparative representation in the initial venire, these disparities
meant that prosecutors were 6.8 times more likely to initiate a challenge for
cause against any given black prospective juror than any given white prospective juror. Defendants, meanwhile, targeted white prospective jurors
with 77.3% of their challenges and black prospective jurors with 15.6% of
their challenges.
FIGURE 3: RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE VENIRE AND CHALLENGES FOR
CAUSE (MISSISSIPPI)
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As in Louisiana, prosecutors’ challenges for cause were even more racially skewed than their peremptory strikes. In the same 83 trials, prosecutors
used 68.1% of their peremptory strikes to exclude black prospective jurors
and 31.6% to exclude white prospective jurors. While this figure represents a
significant “overstriking” of black prospective jurors, it is again not as severe
as the “overchallenging” of black prospective jurors for cause.
FIGURE 4: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN PROSECUTORS’ USE OF PEREMPTORY
STRIKES AND CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE (MISSISSIPPI)

C. “I Didn’t Think There Were Any Left”: Reexamining Three Batson Cases
Another way to see the role that challenges for cause play in the exclusion of nonwhite jurors—and the extent to which we fail to notice this consistent pattern—is by reconstructing the full jury selection process in
individual cases. In Flowers v . Mississippi (2019), Foster v . Chatman (2016),
and Snyder v . Louisiana (2008), the Supreme Court considered whether
prosecutors’ peremptory strikes were improperly motivated by race. 45 In
each of these cases—all of which involved black defendants convicted of
murder 46—a majority of the Court found that lower courts had erred in failing to recognize that racial bias motivated prosecutors’ use of peremptory
strikes. 47 But the parties and the Court paid almost no attention to what

45 . See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019); Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737
(2016); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 490 (2008).
46 . See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2234; Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1742; Snyder, 552 U.S. at 474, 476.
47 . See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2235; Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1755; Snyder, 552 U.S. at 485–86.
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came first: a significant reduction in the pool of eligible black jurors through
challenges for cause.
1.

Flowers v . Mississippi

Curtis Flowers has been tried six times for a quadruple murder that occurred in 1996. 48 The killings took place inside a furniture store in the small,
racially mixed town of Winona (population 5,000) in Montgomery County,
Mississippi; Flowers is black, and three of the four victims were white. In
Flowers’s sixth trial, prosecutors accepted one black juror and then used five
of six peremptory strikes to exclude black prospective jurors. 49 The jury
(consisting of eleven white jurors and one black juror) convicted Flowers
and recommended death. 50 In a 7–2 opinion authored by Justice Kavanaugh,
the Court held that one of the five challenged peremptory strikes was unconstitutionally motivated by race. 51
While the Court’s opinion naturally focused on prosecutors’ peremptory
strikes, the full 1,300-page voir dire transcript (which was not included in the
joint appendix submitted to the Court) shows how prosecutors used more
than just peremptory strikes to assemble a nearly all-white jury in the case. 52
Despite the skewed composition of the final petit jury, the initial pool of
156 prospective jurors was relatively racially balanced: 88 prospective jurors
were white (56%), and 68 prospective jurors were black (44%). 53 Over the
next several days of voir dire, however, these figures shifted. The first round

48 . Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2234. Flowers’s first five trials provide anecdotal evidence that
the racial composition of a jury can be outcome determinative. Flowers’s first trial was before
an all-white jury. He was convicted and sentenced to death. See id . at 2236. The Mississippi
Supreme Court reversed the conviction due to “numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct,” including improper questioning of witnesses and the introduction of impermissible other-crimes evidence. Flowers v. State (Flowers I), 773 So. 2d 309, 327 (Miss. 2000). In the second
trial in 1999, prosecutors used peremptory strikes to eliminate the last five black prospective
jurors; the trial court disallowed one of these strikes under Batson, empaneling a jury with
eleven white jurors and one black juror. See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2236. Flowers was again convicted and sentenced to death. As before, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed on prosecutorial misconduct grounds. Flowers v. State (Flowers II), 842 So. 2d 531, 532 (Miss. 2003). In
the third trial in 2004, prosecutors exercised all fifteen of their peremptory strikes against black
prospective jurors, again producing a jury of eleven white jurors and one black juror; the sole
black juror was seated after the State ran out of peremptory challenges. See Flowers, 139 S. Ct.
at 2236–37. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, with a plurality concluding
that at least two of the strikes were racially motivated. Flowers v. State (Flowers III), 947 So. 2d
910, 916–17 (Miss. 2007) . Flowers’s fourth and fifth trials ended with hung juries; notably, the
juries in those trials included five black jurors and three black jurors, respectively. See Flowers,
139 S. Ct. at 2237.
49 . Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2235–36.
50 . Id . at 2237.
51 . Id . at 2235.
52 . See Voir Dire Transcript at 477–1802, Flowers v. State, No. 2003-0071-CR (Miss.
Cir. Ct. 2010).
53. Frampton, supra note 38, Appendix A.
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of questioning, conducted exclusively by the judge, probed the prospective
jurors’ relationships with the parties, law enforcement, and potential witnesses (and whether those relationships would impact jurors’ ability to be
“fair and impartial”). 54 Equivocal answers often led to heated disputes. For
example, defense attorneys objected to the dismissal of a black female juror
whose son had fathered a child by the defendant’s sister (whose name the juror could not recall); the juror allowed that the relationship “probably”
would impact her ability to be fair and impartial and conceded (upon leading questioning by the judge) that there were “doubts in [her] mind” about
whether she could be fair. 55 Prosecutors were incensed by the defendant’s
objection to her excusal: “Your Honor, for the record I object to them only
objecting to cause strikes on certain jurors. I think it is very clear that they
are only objecting [to] cause on black jurors, and this is extremely improper.” 56
But both parties were following a similar playbook: In the coming days,
when attorneys had the opportunity to question individual jurors, prosecutors objected exclusively to the proposed dismissal of white prospective jurors, while defense attorneys did the same regarding black prospective
jurors. 57 And when the parties had the opportunity to raise challenges for
cause on their own—the bulk of the for-cause dismissals were initially proposed by the judge, subject to the parties’ objections 58—prosecutors raised 11
of their 15 challenges (73%) to urge the elimination of black prospective jurors (nearly all were granted); 18 of the 19 challenges (95%) Flowers raised
sought the exclusion of white prospective jurors (most were denied). 59
In total, challenges for cause resulted in a significant “whitewashing” of
the jury pool. A significant number of prospective jurors (30 white and 7
black) were removed because their relationship with the victims affected
their ability to be fair and impartial; 32 prospective jurors (all black) were
removed because of their relationship with Flowers. 60 “Death qualification” 61
disproportionately excluded black prospective jurors: 9 black jurors and 2
white jurors were removed based on opposition to capital punishment. 62

54 . See, e .g ., Voir Dire Transcript, supra note 52, at 750.
55 . See id . at 751–52, 841.
56 . Id . at 841–42.
57. Frampton, supra note 38, Appendix A; see, e .g ., Voir Dire Transcript, supra note 52,
at 838–39, 844. In the only potential exception to this pattern, the prosecution initially objected
to the for-cause dismissal of a black woman who was related to a victim, id . at 844, before ultimately moving to have her dismissed for cause, id . at 1262.
58 . See, e .g ., Voir Dire Transcript, supra note 52, at 836–59.
59 . See Frampton, supra note 38, Appendix A.
60 . See id .; see also, e .g ., Voir Dire Transcript, supra note 52, at 836–58.
61 . See infra notes 232–234 and accompanying text.
62 . See Frampton, supra note 38, Appendix A; see also, e .g ., Voir Dire Transcript, supra
note 52, at 1260–62.
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And the remainder were struck for a variety of reasons, 63 usually (though not
exclusively) after reporting doubts about their own impartiality. 64 At the end
of voir dire, with over 100 jurors removed for cause, 45 jurors advanced to
the peremptory-strike stage: 35 were white (78%) and only 10 were black
(22%). 65 Thus, before peremptory strikes began, challenges for cause had already eliminated most black prospective jurors from the pool. More importantly, the process also reduced the relative share of black jurors in the
jury pool from 44% of the initial venire to 22% of the “qualified” venire. Peremptory challenges reduced that percentage of black jurors even further to
8% (1 of 12 seated jurors), 66 of course, but the greater part of the racial exclusion in Flowers’s sixth trial was attributable to challenges for cause. 67
2.

Foster v . Chatman

Timothy Foster, who is black, was convicted by an all-white jury and
sentenced to death for the torture and murder of an elderly white woman in
Rome, Georgia. 68 His original trial took place in 1987, but after his direct appeal, Foster obtained prosecutors’ files through a Georgia Open Records Act
request. 69 These documents, which included prosecutors’ handwritten notes
from jury selection, bolstered Foster’s state habeas claim that prosecutors
impermissibly targeted black jurors with their peremptory strikes. 70 In Foster
v . Chatman, the Supreme Court sided with Foster and ordered a new trial. 71
Undertaking an extensive review of the available record, the Court conclud-

63. For example, 8 jurors (6 black and 2 white) were removed for cause after disclosing
that they might be influenced by having had a close friend or family member prosecuted for
unrelated criminal conduct. Nine white jurors were removed for personal or familial connections with law enforcement.
64 . See, e .g ., Voir Dire Transcript, supra note 52, at 1481, 1510, 1536. One notable exception was a white juror successfully challenged by the defense. Although giving assurances
that she could be fair and impartial, the juror began crying when recalling one of the victim’s
funerals, which she attended. See, e .g ., id . at 1634. The court granted the defendant’s challenge
(over prosecutors’ objections): “I think if the mere asking about the case would reduce her to
tears, then I think that would show an indication that she would have real difficulty being fair
and impartial.” Id .
65 . See Frampton, supra note 38, Appendix A.
66 . Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2237 (2019).
67. The ways in which challenges for cause altered the racial composition of the jury
pool was not lost on all members of the Court: Justice Thomas mentioned it briefly in his dissent, though he dismissed the shift as a “statistical abnormality” of little significance. See id . at
2262 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Thomas Ward Frampton, What Justice Thomas Gets
Right About Batson, 72 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2019).
68 . See Foster v. State, 374 S.E.2d 188, 190–91 (Ga. 1988).
69. Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1743 (2016).
70 . See id . at 1744.
71 . Id . at 1755.
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ed that two of prosecutors’ peremptory strikes targeting black jurors were
“motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.” 72
But the full voir dire transcript provides a fuller portrait of racial exclusion. Unlike Flowers’s case, the initial pool in Foster’s prosecution was mostly white: Foster began with 98 prospective jurors, 87 of whom were white
(88.8%) and 11 of whom were black (11.2%). 73 By the time the pool of 50 jurors was “qualified” for peremptory strikes, however, 7 of the 11 black jurors
had already been excused or dismissed. 74 In absolute terms this marks only a
modest decline in the total percentage of black jurors in the venire (from
11.2% to 8.0%), but comparatively, it marks a 29% drop in black jurors’
“share” of the total. 75 The decline was significant enough that the trial judge
acted surprised when defense counsel asked how the judge wished to handle
(anticipated) Batson challenges during the final stage of jury selection. “I
didn’t realize we had any left,” the judge remarked, referring to black jurors. 76
Prosecutors seemed particularly keen to excuse black jurors using challenges for cause, even when the jurors’ possible bias seemed to favor their
side. One black prospective juror, for instance, gave conflicting answers as to
whether she would “lean” in favor of the prosecution or the defense; 77 as to
the death penalty, though, she indicated clearly that she would vote to impose death if the jury reached a “guilty” verdict (“If somebody has done
killed somebody, yeah, an eye for an eye.”). 78 Prosecutors, correctly, 79 recognized that this bias in favor of capital punishment provided grounds to challenge the juror and she was excused (without defense objection). 80 When
white jurors demonstrated similar progovernment biases, however, prosecutors remained silent or fought to rehabilitate them. 81
72 . Id . at 1754.
73. Frampton, supra note 38, Appendix B.
74 . Id .; see also Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1743.
75 . Cf . Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 323 (2010) (“ ‘Absolute disparity’ is determined
by subtracting the percentage of African-Americans in the jury pool (here, 6% in the six
months leading up to Smith’s trial) from the percentage of African-Americans in the local, jury-eligible population (here, 7.28%). By an absolute disparity measure, therefore, AfricanAmericans were underrepresented by 1.28%. ‘Comparative disparity’ is determined by dividing
the absolute disparity (here, 1.28%) by the group’s representation in the jury-eligible population (here, 7.28%). The quotient (here, 18%) showed that, in the six months prior to Smith’s
trial, African-Americans were, on average, 18% less likely, when compared to the overall juryeligible population, to be on the jury-service list.”).
76. Voir Dire Transcript at 1330, Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1743 (2016) (No.
14-8349).
77 . Id . at 780.
78 . Id . at 782.
79 . See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 719 (1992) (holding that “a capital defendant
may challenge for cause any prospective juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty”).
80. Voir Dire Transcript, supra note 76, at 782.
81 . See, e .g ., id . at 920.
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Race also seemed to have provided important subtext when the attorneys debated jurors’ claims of hardship. For example, after an older black juror was qualified, prosecutors nevertheless urged that she be excused:
Before we ask the other juror to come in, I just have one—you know, I
don’t know. . . . [C]onsidering that this case may or may not go into next
week, the fact that Mrs. Hardge has a husband who is a double amputee;
that has no reason—has no other help but herself, and she has claimed that
this sequestered trial would be a hardship. . . . I also feel like that we ought
to accommodate Mrs. Hardge and ask that she be excused, purely for the
reasons—her reflections—her answer to the question. 82

Moments later, however, prosecutors’ solicitude was absent when a younger
white juror protested that she “[a]bsolutely” had a reason not to be sequestered insofar as she “ha[d] an 18-month-old daughter who” needed her
care. 83
Apart from the exclusions first suggested by the court, prosecutors
raised 10 challenges for cause (all but one of which were granted); of these, 4
aimed to eliminate black jurors and 6 aimed to eliminate white jurors. 84 Given the small percentage of black jurors in the initial venire (11.2%), the frequency of challenges for cause against black jurors (40%) was 357% what we
would expect if race and challenges for cause were not correlated. All 11 of
Foster’s challenges sought the exclusion of white jurors, though this represents only a 13% increase over the “expected” frequency of challenges to
white jurors; the court granted only 3 of Foster’s challenges. 85
3.

Snyder v . Louisiana

Allen Snyder, who is black, was tried for capital murder before an allwhite jury in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, in 1996. 86 Of the 36 jurors remaining at the final stage of jury selection, 5 were black. 87 Prosecutors used 7 peremptory strikes against white prospective jurors and 5 against the remaining
black prospective jurors, ensuring an all-white jury. 88 Snyder was convicted

82 . Id . at 420–21. The trial judge politely declined the invitation. Id . (“THE COURT:
Well, when the Court sits here and sees the husband, the double amputee, get up and walk out
unassisted, except by a cane, then he appears to the Court that he can get his own water, go to
the bathroom, whatever is needed. So I don’t believe he’s helpless. [PROSECUTOR]: I noticed
he was smiling as he left the courtroom too, and the way he waved . . . . THE COURT: Well,
he’s been knowing me, and I’ve been knowing him for close to a hundred years.”).
83 . See id . at 459; see also id . at 1069 (arguing, during defense questioning of a white
prospective juror, “[n]obody wants to sit on the jury”).
84 . See Frampton, supra note 38, Appendix B.
85 . See id .
86. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 474–76 (2008).
87 . Id . at 475–76.
88 . See Frampton, supra note 38, Appendix C. For each of the jurors in the Snyder dataset, the “race” information was hand-collected by cross-referencing the jurors’ addresses—
drawn from the master jury list document from the court file, Listing of Jurors Assigned to
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and sentenced to death. 89 In 2008, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding
that the peremptory strike of at least one of the black jurors was motivated in
substantial part by discriminatory intent. 90
The all-white jury in Snyder’s case was assembled from an initial pool
that—although not reflecting the overall demographics of Jefferson Parish—
looked relatively diverse. In the initial group of 138 potential jurors, 108
were white (78.3%), 24 were black (17.4%), and 6 were Asian, Hispanic, or
“Other” (4.3%). 91 From the outset, prosecutors aggressively pursued potential challenges for cause against black jurors. One black juror, for instance,
indicated that she might be unable to serve because she was “a diabetic, and I
get so nervous a lot.” 92 When defense attorneys assured the juror that the
court “ha[d] a whole staff of people that [she] could call on if [she] felt nervous,” the juror allowed that she might get nervous even with access to her
medication: “Because you see, I had a son that was in jail, and he died in
jail.” 93 Prosecutors immediately interjected: “This is about the death penalty
too, ma’am, you’re going to see gruesome photos, and hear about murder.
That’s going to make you nervous?” 94 The reluctant juror allowed that it
would, and she was excused for cause. 95
As in Flowers’s trial, the attorneys explicitly referenced prospective jurors’ race while making challenges for cause. When prosecutors successfully
removed one black juror for cause—the juror admitted to wanting to kill his
wife’s lover, in circumstances similar to the allegations against the defendant—defense attorneys objected and “note[d] for the record that [the prospective juror] is a black man.” 96 The remark triggered a terse on-the-record
argument between the two prosecutors, who debated whether they should
proffer additional race-neutral justifications for their challenge. 97
Overall, as in Flowers and Foster, there were unmistakable patterns in
whom the parties challenged for cause (and when the parties objected).
Prosecutors initiated 24 challenges for cause, 5 against black prospective ju-

Case 955114, State v. Snyder, No. 95-5114 (La. Dist. Ct. Aug. 27, 1996)—with public records,
including voter registration documents and criminal or traffic records.
89 . Snyder, 552 U.S. at 474.
90 . Id . at 485.
91 . See Frampton, supra note 38, Appendix C.
92. Joint Appendix at 116, Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) (No. 06-10119).
93 . Id . at 117.
94 . Id .
95 . Id . at 117–18.
96 . Id . at 562–63, 584.
97 . See id . at 584–85 (“[PROSECUTOR 1]: Well, he’s being excused for cause is my understanding. If the cause would not hold up, Judge, my reasoning– [PROSECUTOR 2]: No,
you don’t – Would you be quiet? You don’t have to give one. [PROSECUTOR 1]: Jim, look,
please don’t do that again. [PROSECUTOR 2]: Fred – Okay. Don’t put anything on the record
that we don’t have to put on. [PROSECUTOR 1]: Please don’t do that again. [PROSECUTOR
2]: But don’t – [PROSECUTOR 1]: Then don’t – Just don’t do that again. THE COURT: All
right. Any other challenges for cause?”).
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rors and 2 against Asian prospective jurors. 98 This frequency of challenges
against nonwhite prospective jurors (29.2%) was 35% greater than what one
might expect based on nonwhite jurors’ representation in the initial pool
(21.7%). Prosecutors vocally objected to the dismissal of only 4 jurors for
cause; all were white. 99 Defense attorneys, meanwhile, overwhelmingly targeted white prospective jurors: of their 35 challenges, 33 were made against
white prospective jurors, and 2 targeted Hispanic or “Other” prospective jurors. 100 Defense counsel also objected mainly, although not exclusively, to
the excusal of black jurors urged by prosecutors or suggested by the court. 101
While nearly a quarter of the initial venire comprised nonwhite jurors, the
final pool before peremptory challenges comprised 31 white jurors (86%), 5
black jurors (14%), and no other nonwhite jurors. 102
*

*

*

At the end of the voir dire process, peremptory strikes often have dramatic effects on the racial composition of the “qualified” venire: the final
strikes in Foster and Snyder, for example, removed 100% of the potential
black jurors remaining at that late point in the proceedings. 103 For all of our
focus on how the last black jurors were removed in a case, however, we rarely ask what happened to the first, second, and third black jurors excused. 104
The data from Louisiana, from Mississippi, and from recent Batson cases
suggest that challenges for cause also serve as an important, but overlooked,
vehicle for racial exclusion.
II.

THE MISSING LAW OF CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE

We lack a legal framework for addressing the form of racial exclusion
detailed in Part I. Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has “constitutionalized” parts of the jury selection process in important ways. 105 Under Taylor
98 . See Frampton, supra note 38, Appendix C.
99 . Id .
100 . Id .
101 . Id .
102 . Id .
103. Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1741 (2016); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472,
476 (2008).
104. While this Article argues that challenges for cause merit greater attention in their
own right, our failure to examine challenges for cause also undermines our ability to recognize
the pernicious effects of peremptory strikes. Justice Marshall presciently touched upon the relationship between the two forms of exclusion in his Batson concurrence. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 105 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing that “where only one or two
black jurors survive the challenges for cause, the prosecutor need have no compunction about
striking them from the jury because of their race” because it will be difficult for defendants to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination).
105 . See Leipold, supra note 26; William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 62–63 (1997).
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v . Louisiana 106 and Duren v . Missouri, 107 criminal juries must be drawn from
a representative cross section of the community; under Batson v . Kentucky 108
and its progeny, racially motivated peremptory strikes are forbidden. 109 But
the Supreme Court’s constitutional (de)regulation of challenges for cause
complicates this narrative. Over the past several decades, the Court has quietly insulated the challenge-for-cause process, including racial exclusion
through such challenges, from meaningful review. In the interstices of the
Court’s fair-cross-section, equal protection, and due process jurisprudence,
there is a missing law of challenges for cause.
Before turning to the constitutional dimensions of the problem, though,
it is helpful to think through what might be driving the disparities identified
in Part I. Consider three possible accounts:
!

The “disparate impact” theory—Prosecutors and judges are acting
in a perfectly race-neutral manner, but certain disqualifying beliefs and experiences (e.g., opposition to capital punishment, negative views of law enforcement) are more prevalent among black
potential jurors. 110 In a polarized community, even if prosecutors
eschew any reliance on race during jury selection, such dynamics
could lead to radically unrepresentative juries.

!

The “mixed motive” theory—Prosecutors’ principal aim is to exclude any jurors prone to acquit defendants, but they consider
race as a method of identifying and targeting those jurors. Prosecutors thus ask leading questions of black prospective jurors designed to elicit disqualifying responses, while largely ignoring
white prospective jurors. 111 The result is that prosecutors disproportionately identify and eliminate black jurors (many of whom
may, in fact, be “biased” or “partial”).

106. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
107. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
108. 476 U.S. 79.
109. In this regard, jury selection mirrors most other aspects criminal procedure from
the Warren Court onward. See Stuntz, supra note 105, at 18 (discussing constitutional regulation of jury selection as parcel of larger constitutionalization of criminal procedure).
110 . See Baldus et al., supra note 3 (noting stark racial differences in opinion polls tracking attitudes toward law enforcement); see also Jocelyn Simonson, Essay, The Place of “the People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 277–78 (2019) (“But these doctrines
defining the composition of ‘unbiased’ juries exemplify a conception of criminal procedure
that defines ‘bias’ as the tendency to side with defendants.”).
111 . See JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN
COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 152–53 (1977) (discussing training materials in
Dallas County District Attorney’s Office instructing prosecutors to avoid “any member of a
minority group . . . they almost always empathize with the accused”); Roberts, Asymmetry as
Fairness, supra note 1, at 1522–23 (discussing a prosecution training video in Philadelphia explicitly recommending reliance on prohibited group-based assumptions).
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The “judicial bias” theory—Rather than focusing on jurors or
prosecutors, the problem rests with judges. 112 Perhaps judges
generally are indulgent in granting challenges for cause raised by
prosecutors and/or against black jurors and stingy when weighing
equally worthy challenges raised by defendants and/or against
white jurors. The result is a significant number of erroneous rulings on challenges for cause—incorrect findings that particular
jurors are or are not sufficiently “impartial” to warrant removal—
that skew the racial composition of the pool.

I suspect there is some merit to each of the foregoing explanations, and
ascribing relative weight to each causal mechanism is beyond the scope of
this Article. But if any of these accounts are accurate, we might expect the
law to provide some meaningful relief. That assumption, it turns out, would
be wrong.
Section II.A examines the Court’s fair-cross-section jurisprudence and
its relationship to challenges for cause. If the “disparate impact” theory is
correct, the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement would seem
like a plausible vehicle for confronting this phenomenon. A jury pool from
which most or all nonwhite potential jurors have been purged through challenges for cause hardly seems “fairly representative of the community,” 113
after all. And, unlike equal protection claims, fair-cross-section challenges do
not require a showing of discriminatory bias, so the fact that prosecutors
were acting in a scrupulously race-neutral manner when raising their challenges for cause should not pose any doctrinal obstacles. 114 But, as Section
II.A explains, any Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section claim would likely
fail if used to contest racial disparities attributable to challenges for cause.
Section II.B turns to the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, which
since 1880 has limited (some forms of) racial discrimination in jury selection. If the “mixed motive” theory is correct—if prosecutors were invidiously
relying upon potential jurors’ race to decide which jurors to target for challenge and removal—we might think such a practice would offend the Equal
Protection Clause’s prohibition on “[r]acial discrimination in [the] selection
of jurors.” 115 Again, though, this assumption would be mistaken.
Finally, Section II.C examines the Court’s approach to judges’ errors in
accepting or rejecting a challenge for cause; these cases typically turn on the
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an “impartial jury” and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. If the “judicial bias” theory is correct, we
might expect to see a considerable body of case law dealing with the erroneous denial of defendants’ challenges for cause or the erroneous granting of

112. Bennett, supra note 5, at 149–50 (“My own introduction to implicit bias was deeply
unnerving. . . . [A]s a former civil rights lawyer and seasoned federal district court judge . . . I
was eager to take the [implicit bias] test. I knew I would ‘pass’ with flying colors. I didn’t.”).
113. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
114. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368 n.26 (1979).
115. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).
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prosecutors’ challenges for cause. Yet, once more, the Court’s rulings over
the past several decades have foreclosed any meaningful avenue for defendants to obtain relief. Even glaring errors in such rulings, the Court has held,
do not violate the constitutional rights of defendants.
A. Fair Cross Section
The argument that black citizens simply are not “qualified” to serve on
juries in similar numbers as white citizens now seems deeply antithetical to
basic constitutional norms. There is a solid constitutional basis for this intuition: the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an “impartial jury” has been interpreted to encompass a defendant’s right to a jury drawn from a
“representative cross section of the community.” 116 And importantly, the
question of “discriminatory purpose” is irrelevant to claims alleging that an
unrepresentative jury pool violates this fair-cross-section requirement; the
Court long ago recognized that race-neutral practices in assembling venires
could result in race and sex disparities sufficient to implicate the Sixth
Amendment. 117 But this “representative” conception of the jury is of surprisingly recent vintage, and it remains modest in its reach. 118 Because the Court
has limited its fair-cross-section inquiry only to the demographic composition of the initial venire (i.e., those summoned to the courthouse) and endorsed unrepresentative venires when “significant state interests” are
implicated, even the complete exclusion of nonwhite jurors through challenges for cause would likely survive Sixth Amendment scrutiny.
To understand why, it is important to remember that for most of American history, the fact that petit juries were drawn from unrepresentative lists
was not understood to be in tension with the Constitution; rather, it was assumed that juries would comprise only an elite (and thus, necessarily, disproportionately white and male) subset of the population. 119 From
Reconstruction to the Civil Rights Era, criminal defendants occasionally succeeded in challenging convictions by arguing that local officials deliberately
and completely excluded black jurors in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 120 But, for the most part, the eviden116 . Taylor, 419 U.S. at 528.
117 . Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 n.26 (distinguishing Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section
claims from Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims). But see Nina W. Chernoff,
Wrong About the Right: How Courts Undermine the Fair Cross-Section Guarantee by Confusing
It with Equal Protection, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 141 (2012).
118. Jeffrey Abramson, The Jury and Democratic Theory, 1 J. POL. PHIL. 45 (1993); accord
Leipold, supra note 26, at 951 (“The phrase ‘fair cross section of the community’ sounds so
natural to the modern ear that it is easy to believe that the requirement has always been part of
the right to a jury trial. To the contrary . . . .”).
119 . See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 19, at 894–95, 898–901 (providing detailed explanations of how women and people of color were excluded from jury service in the United
States).
120 . See, e .g ., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400
(1942); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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tiary burden required to prevail—typically, at minimum, a candid admission
of racist intent and the total exclusion of the targeted group—made equal
protection claims prohibitively difficult to assert successfully. 121
Importantly, the bulk of this race-based (and sex-based) exclusion occurred by application of “neutral” criteria. In 1910, for example, the Supreme
Court heard an appeal from a black South Carolina man—condemned to
death by an all-white jury—challenging the state’s jury selection process. 122
Under state law, jury commissioners were charged with preparing lists of
prospective jurors of “good moral character” and “sound judgment”; the defendant urged that such arbitrary criteria permitted the complete exclusion
of black jurors from venires. 123 The Court had little trouble upholding the
law, since “nothing in this statute . . . discriminates against individuals on
account of race or color . . . . [It] simply provides for an exercise of judgment
in attempting to secure competent jurors of proper qualifications.” 124 “Key
man” systems—under which civic leaders, judges, or local officials would
nominate citizens for jury service based on their reputations for intelligence
or good character—were the norm for most of the twentieth century. 125 And
as late as the 1970s, even while devoting greater scrutiny to the discriminatory application of such standards, the Court positively cited these Jim Crow–
era precedents affirming the states’ freedom to exclude from jury service
those lacking “good intelligence, sound judgment, and fair character.” 126 Of
course, the potential for such race-neutral criteria to generate massive racial
disparities in jury composition was never a secret. 127 But it was not until the
Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, which mandated random selection of
prospective jurors from voter lists, that Congress finally abolished the practice in federal courts. 128

121. Frampton, supra note 3, at 1641–43.
122. Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U.S. 161 (1910).
123 . Id . at 167–68.
124 . Id . at 168.
125 . See Akhil Reed Amar, Note, Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 YALE L.J.
1283, 1287 (1984); see also Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene Cty., 396 U.S. 320, 331 (1970)
(upholding Alabama requirement that jurors be “generally reputed to be honest and intelligent
and . . . esteemed in the community for their integrity, good character and sound judgment”
(quoting ALA. CODE § 30-21 (Supp. 1967))); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 353–54 (1970)
(upholding requirement that jurors be “upright” and “intelligent”).
126 . Carter, 396 U.S. at 332 (citing Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 589 (1896)).
127 . See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935). For a rich account of a legal challenge to the exclusion of Mexican American jurors in
Los Angeles, see IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE
(2003).
128. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 53 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1861–1869 (2018)).

810

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 118:785

The cross-sectional ideal was constitutionalized seven years later in Taylor v. Louisiana.129 There, the Supreme Court first held that “the selection of
a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”130 Four years
later, in Duren v. Missouri,131 the Court clarified its fair-cross-section inquiry. The Court explained that a prima facie violation of the fair-crosssection requirement is established where (1) a “distinctive” group is involved; (2) its underrepresentation in jury venires is “not fair and reasonable
in relation to the number of such persons in the community”; and (3) this
disparity is due to “systematic exclusion” in the jury selection process.132 Upon such a showing, the State must identify a “significant state interest [that
is] manifestly and primarily advanced by those aspects of the jury-selection
process . . . that result in the disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive
group.”133
But there are at least two significant obstacles to countering the form of
racial exclusion at issue in this Article—the continuing exclusion of
nonwhite jurors through challenges for cause—under the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement. First, while criminal defendants have
a right to a jury drawn from a representative cross section of the community,
the Court has been unwilling to extend its “representativeness” inquiry beyond the composition of the initial venire (before the “qualification” process). In 1986, a week after issuing its landmark opinion in Batson v.
Kentucky, the Court issued an opinion rejecting a fair-cross-section claim
based on the elimination of jurors unwilling to impose the death penalty (socalled “Witherspoon-excludable” jurors134) from the guilt phase of a bifurcated capital trial.135 Such jurors, the Court held in Lockhart v. McCree, were
not a “ ‘distinctive’ group in the community,” so the defendant’s fair-crosssection claim failed under Duren’s first prong.136 But in expansive dicta, the
Court also went much further:
[W]e do not believe that the fair-cross-section requirement can, or should,
be applied as broadly as [the appellate] court attempted to apply it. We
have never invoked the fair-cross-section principle to invalidate the use of
either for-cause or peremptory challenges to prospective jurors, or to re-

129. 419 U.S. 522, 526, 528 (1975). As Professor Leipold notes, supra note 26, at 952–55,
the phrase “cross-section of the community” first appeared in the 1940s. See Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187, 191 (1946); Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946); Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942).
130. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 528.
131. 439 U.S. 357, 358–60 (1979).
132. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
133. Id. at 367–68.
134. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
135. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
136. Id.
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quire petit juries, as opposed to jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition of the community at large. 137

Four years later, in Holland v . Illinois, the Court returned to the issue, rejecting a claim that prosecutors’ removal of the only two black jurors from a venire (through peremptory strikes) violated the Sixth Amendment’s faircross-section requirement. 138 “[O]nce a fair hand is dealt,” the Court explained, the Sixth Amendment had nothing to say about the “eliminat[ion
of] prospective jurors belonging to groups [a party] believes would unduly
favor the other side.” 139
But even if the Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section requirement dictated that petit juries be drawn from representative pools of qualified jurors
(i.e., after the winnowing that occurs during challenges for cause)—as Justice
Thurgood Marshall argued for, in dissent, in Holland v . Illinois 140—racial
disparities stemming from disproportionate challenges for cause might still
be permissible: demographic disparities that advance a “significant state interest” 141 do not offend the Sixth Amendment. In Duren, the Court indicated
that a state has such an interest in “assuring that those members of the family responsible for the care of children are available to do so”; sex disparities
in jury venires arising from an “appropriately tailored” rule to further this
goal, the Court said, would likely satisfy the Sixth Amendment. 142 The Taylor
Court noted that significant disparities might also be permissible if arising
from a state’s decision to exempt “those engaged in particular occupations
the uninterrupted performance of which is critical to the community’s welfare.” 143 The State’s interest in excluding biased or partial jurors to ensure
“the fairness and integrity of [the] judicial process” 144 would likely qualify as
a “significant” interest, too. 145
If there is a constitutional infirmity in the massively disproportionate
exclusion of nonwhite jurors through challenges for cause, it does not lie in
its inconsistency with the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement, at least as presently constituted.

137 . Id . at 173.
138. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
139 . Holland, 493 U.S. at 481.
140 . See id . at 497–98 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[N]o rational distinction can be drawn
in the context of our fair-cross-section jurisprudence between the claims we accepted in Taylor
and Duren and the claim at issue here.”).
141. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367–68 (1979).
142 . Id . at 370.
143. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 (1975) (citing Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S.
638 (1906)).
144. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 56 (1992).
145 . See infra Section III.D (discussing case law emphasizing the importance of public
perceptions that jury adjudication is fair).
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B. Equal Protection
What if the disparities identified in Part I are, at least in part, attributable to challenging decisions that are, in fact, partially “based on race” (i.e.,
motivated by the sort of discriminatory intent Batson proscribes)? In the
context of peremptory strikes, scholars generally assume that race- and sexbased decisionmaking remains rampant. Challenges for cause, of course, are
different—proponents must articulate good justifications for their challenges, and courts must sign off on these rationales. 146 But an attorney’s invocation of a cognizable for-cause justification does not foreclose the possibility
that her decision to target and challenge that juror was also tainted by improper bias. If racial bias frequently motivates the decision to exercise a peremptory strike—clear constitutional prohibition notwithstanding—it seems
improbable that such bias would play no role in the exercise of challenges for
cause against the same prospective jurors. Challenges for cause offer attorneys a free bite at the apple, without the risk of sanction. 147
To the extent racial bias does inform challenges for cause, one might assume the practice implicates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause. Since Strauder v . West Virginia, a landmark case involving a state
statute that on its face prohibited the summoning of black jurors, the Court
has held that “discriminating in the selection of jurors . . . because of their
color” denies criminal defendants equal protection of the laws in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 148 Shortly after Strauder, in Neal v . Delaware,
the Court clarified that discriminatory practices in summoning potential jurors could also deny defendants “equal protection of the laws” 149 (even where
“there was no law of the State forbidding” the selection of black jurors outright 150). A century later, in Batson, the Court addressed racial bias in the exercise of peremptory strikes, but in broad terms reaffirmed the constitutional
prohibition against any “[r]acial discrimination in [the] selection of jurors.” 151 “[T]he State may not draw up its jury lists pursuant to neutral procedures,” the Court explained, “but then resort to discrimination at ‘other
stages in the selection process.’ ” 152 If the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
intentional racial discrimination in the drawing of the venire (as in Strauder

146 . See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2019).
147. Attorneys currently face one (exceedingly minor) risk by engaging in nakedly biased
practices when raising challenges for cause: this behavior can provide circumstantial evidence
that their subsequent peremptory strikes were race motivated. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U.S. 322, 344 (2003) (discussing disparate questioning as evidence of improper motive).
148. 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880).
149. 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1881) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880)).
150 . Neal, 103 U.S. at 400 (Field, J., dissenting).
151. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86–87 (1986).
152 . Id . at 88 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)); see also McCray v.
New York, 461 U.S. 961, 968 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“The
systematic exclusion of prospective jurors because of their race is therefore unconstitutional at
any stage of the jury selection process.”).
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v . Virginia and Neal v . Delaware) and at the peremptory-strike stage (as in
Batson v . Kentucky), it is reasonable to think it prohibits discrimination that
occurs in between.
But, as with the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement, our
existing equal protection doctrine offers little help when confronting racial
exclusion in the challenge-for-cause context. The first, and more mundane,
obstacle is same that plagues Batson: the practical problem of proof of discriminatory purpose. At the final stage of Batson’s familiar three-step
framework, those challenging a peremptory strike carry the burden of proving that the proponent’s race-neutral justification is merely “pretextual.” 153
As Justice Thurgood Marshall foresaw, this burden will rarely be met unless
the “proffered ‘neutral explanation’ plainly betrays an underlying impermissible purpose.” 154 In the challenge-for-cause context, however, where the
proponent has articulated a valid “for cause” basis for excluding the juror,
the race-neutral explanation is (almost by definition) not completely frivolous or transparently thin. And, having just endorsed the sufficiency of the
proponent’s stated rationale, the trial court would be hard-pressed to then
declare it pretextual. As with challenges to peremptory strikes, there may be
ways to surmount this hurdle in exceptional circumstances 155—for example,
prosecutors’ notes, 156 comparative analyses with unchallenged jurors, 157 disparate questioning, 158 historical evidence of racial bias 159—but anything resembling the current Batson framework for identifying and eliminating
racial bias in this context is structurally ill-suited to the task. 160

153. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1995).
154. Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 928 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); accord Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 1, at 1077–78 (“[T]he Supreme Court has decreed that before a trial court can find a Batson violation it must determine that an attorney has
(1) exercised a racially motivated peremptory challenge and (2) lied to the court in an effort to
justify the strike. The trial court must find all of this based almost solely on the attorney’s demeanor. Accordingly, trial courts rightly hesitate to make the damning findings Batson requires on such paltry evidence. Add to this the fact that attorneys may not even be aware of the
racial motivation for their own strikes, as well as the administrative difficulty of remedying
Batson violations, and it should come as no surprise that Batson, in application, is all form and
little substance.” (footnote omitted)).
155 . See Abel, supra note 8, at 726; see also supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing discovery of discriminatory policies and training materials).
156 . Cf . Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1743–44 (2016) (detailing documents, including prosecutors’ notes, disclosed pursuant to Georgia Open Records Act request).
157 . Cf . Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 483 (2008) (“A comparison between Mr.
Brooks and Roland Laws, a white juror, is particularly striking.”).
158 . Cf . Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 256–57 (2005) (“The State concedes that this
disparate questioning did occur but argues that use of the graphic script turned not on a panelist’s race but on expressed ambivalence about the death penalty in the preliminary questionnaire. . . . This argument, however, . . . simply does not fit the facts.”).
159 . Cf . Craft, supra note 44.
160 . But see Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors, supra note 1 (exploring flexibility of Batson framework to counter exclusionary justifications that have disparate impact).
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But there is an antecedent problem: even if a proponent candidly admitted that racial bias motivated a successful challenge for cause, the federal
courts’ tepid equal protection jurisprudence (particularly in the jury selection context) leaves uncertain whether such discrimination would offend the
Fourteenth Amendment at all. An analogous situation arises in the case of
“dual motive” or “mixed motive” peremptory strikes. When a combination
of permissible and impermissible considerations animate a peremptory
strike, attorneys frequently argue that the impermissible bias, although present, was not “determinative” of the decision to exercise the strike. 161 The
Supreme Court, in a footnote in Foster, declined to resolve whether this defense should be available in response to a Batson challenge. 162 But every federal court of appeals to consider the question has endorsed some version of
the defense, essentially creating a “Batson Step 4.” In the Second, Third,
Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, the “person accused of discrimination
[in jury selection may] avoid liability by showing that the same action would
have been taken in the absence of the improper motivation.” 163 The Ninth
Circuit has endorsed a more modest version of the defense, allowing the use
of peremptory strikes tainted by purposeful discrimination if such bias did
not “in substantial part” motivate the decision. 164 (Many states, on the other
hand, reject this approach. 165 If discriminatory reasons motivated the strike
in any way, the juror’s removal is per se unconstitutional. 166)
Were the courts to seriously scrutinize the role of racial bias in challenges for cause, a similar problem would undoubtedly arise. 167 Even if race
161 . See Covey, supra note 1, at 289 (discussing mixed-motive peremptory challenges); cf .
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 271–72 n.21 (1977)
(“Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a racially discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have required invalidation of the challenged decision. Such proof
would, however, have shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that the same decision
would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered. If this were established, the complaining party in a case of this kind no longer fairly could attribute the injury
complained of to improper consideration of a discriminatory purpose.”).
162. Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1754 n.6 (2016).
163. Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 26–27 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Gattis v. Snyder,
278 F.3d 222, 234–35 (3d Cir. 2002); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1531 (8th Cir. 1995); Wallace v. Morrison, 87 F.3d 1271, 1275
(11th Cir. 1996).
164. Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana,
552 U.S. 472, 485 (2008)).
165. People v. Douglas, 232 Cal. Rptr. 3d 305, 314–15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (collecting
cases).
166 . See id .; see also Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 928 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
167. The difficulty here is not one of remedy. A common response to a Batson violation,
if identified during jury selection, is the seating of the improperly challenged juror. See Jason
Mazzone, Batson Remedies, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1613, 1624 (2012). When dealing with a biasmotivated challenge for cause, because there has already been a judicial finding that the challenged juror is “unqualified,” seating that juror may be impossible. Bellin & Semitsu, supra
note 1, at 1110. But trial courts may, and frequently do, remedy a Batson violation in other
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played an important role in the decision to challenge a particular juror for
cause, the proponent of the challenge could highlight that independent and
sufficient reasons exist for the contested juror’s removal. Of course, the fact
that the same result could have been (but was not) achieved by lawful means
does not necessarily render government conduct lawful, particularly in the
criminal context. For example, the Equal Protection Clause bars the government from prosecuting a criminal defendant—no matter how guilty—
where “the decision whether to prosecute [is] based on ‘an unjustifiable
standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification’ ” (at least in
theory). 168 But, to the extent the mixed-motive defense enjoys success when
it comes to peremptory strikes, it is unsettled whether even the clearest
showing of racial bias would matter when contesting an otherwise meritorious challenge for cause on equal protection grounds.
C. Impartial Jury/Due Process
Sections II.A and II.B have dealt with the relationship between challenges for cause and constitutional doctrines typically associated with race and
the jury. But what of more straightforward claims—which may or may not
implicate race—that the trial court erred in granting or denying a challenge
for cause? Such systemic errors by judges, particularly if skewed in favor of
prosecutors or certain categories of potential jurors, could also account for
the disparities described in Part I.
If such slanted and erroneous rulings were a widespread problem, however, we would expect to see the issue frequently litigated (just as Batson
claims are frequently pursued on appeal). 169 But this expectation presupposes the availability of meaningful relief. Traditionally, claims that the trial
court erred in ruling on a challenge for cause have been litigated as implicating the defendant’s right to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment or
the defendant’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

ways. Mazzone, supra at 1614. Dismissing the entire venire, stripping peremptory strikes from
the offending party, or granting additional peremptory strikes to the opposing party (as well as
disciplinary sanctions) are all responses to Batson violations that would apply equally well to a
problematic challenge for cause. Id . at 1614, 1624; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 6
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.3(d) (4th ed. 2015), Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2019).
168. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368
U.S. 448, 456 (1962)). The caveat “at least in theory” is necessary here in light of the courts’
extraordinary reluctance to grant such claims. See, e .g ., Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the
Criminal Justice System: The Role of the Prosecutor, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 202, 213
(2007) (noting the difficult burden faced by defendants raising such claims); see also Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 616 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that “[w]hat a man
could do is not at all the same as what he would do” in context of inevitable discovery doctrine
(quoting J.L. Austin, Ifs and Cans, 42 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 109, 111–12 (1956))). But see Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding arresting officer’s subjective motivation irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis of lawfulness of stop). Thanks to Professor Russell
Covey for suggesting the Armstrong analogy.
169 . See Abel, supra note 8, at 733 (celebrating virtues of Batson in appellate litigation).

816

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 118:785

Once again, however, the Court has largely shut the door to such arguments
in recent years.
1.

Erroneous Grants of (Prosecutors’) Challenges for Cause

The Term after Batson, the Court signaled it was prepared to devote
similar scrutiny to other improper exclusions in the jury selection process. In
1987, the Court heard a capital case, Gray v . Mississippi, presenting the question whether an erroneous for-cause exclusion was subject to harmless-error
review; in a 5–4 opinion, the Court indicated that the answer was “no.” 170 In
Gray, the trial court granted prosecutors’ challenge for cause to a prospective
juror who indicated moderate (but not disqualifying) reluctance to impose a
death sentence. 171 The defendant was convicted and sentenced to death. 172
The Mississippi Supreme Court acknowledged that the juror’s dismissal was
erroneous, but it nevertheless held that the exclusion was “harmless error.” 173
The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the death sentence. 174 Even if prosecutors had unexercised peremptory strikes remaining (i.e., strikes they
might have used to eliminate the disputed juror), the Court explained, the
complex and unpredictable “nature of the jury selection process defies any
attempt to establish” what might have happened had a proper ruling been
made. 175 The effect of adopting a harmless-error approach “would be to insulate jury selection error from meaningful appellate review.” 176 The relevant
inquiry was simply “whether the composition of the jury panel as a whole
could possibly have been affected by the trial court’s error.” 177 When the trial
court improperly excused a juror who should have remained, that bar was
met. 178
But the very next Term—with Justice Kennedy now occupying the seat
formerly held by Justice Powell—the Gray dissenters gained a fifth vote and
promptly issued an opinion clarifying that Gray should not be “applied literally.” 179 In Ross v . Oklahoma—a case that involved the somewhat different
issue of defense challenges for cause 180—the Court went out of its way to cabin Gray: the prior opinion applied solely to the validity of a death sentence in
170. 481 U.S. 648, 660 (1987).
171. The trial court expressly found that the juror was capable of imposing death, and the
Mississippi Supreme Court agreed that the juror “was clearly qualified to be seated as a juror
under the Adams and Witt criteria.” Gray v. State, 472 So. 2d 409, 422 (Miss. 1985).
172 . Id . at 411.
173 . Id . at 422–23.
174 . Gray, 481 U.S. at 668.
175 . Id . at 665.
176 . Id .
177 . Id . (quoting Moore v. Estelle, 670 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir. 1982) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
178 . Id . at 664–65.
179. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 87 (1988).
180 . See infra Section II.C.2.
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a capital case where a prospective juror was erroneously found to be a
“Witherspoon-excludable” juror (i.e., someone unable to impose the death
penalty). 181 In every other setting in which a prosecutor’s challenge for cause
was erroneously granted, the inquiry should focus not on the improper exclusion of the qualified juror but rather on the impartiality of those replacement jurors who tried and convicted the defendant. 182 Even if the trial court
erred (and perhaps spared prosecutors the need to exercise a peremptory
challenge), the defendant could not complain of the impartiality of the actually empaneled petit jury. 183 Accordingly, his rights under the Sixth
Amendment were not violated. 184
A recent case from Massachusetts’s high court, Commonwealth v . Williams, 185 illustrates the practical problems that defendants face when raising
these sorts of claims (and, coincidentally, the ways that race may inform
challenges for cause). There, during voir dire, a prospective juror shared her
belief that “the system is rigged against young African American males,” particularly with respect to drug prosecutions, and the trial court granted prosecutors’ challenge for cause. 186 Surveying the nuanced distinction between
strongly held personal beliefs and improper bias, the Supreme Judicial Court
decided that the trial judge abused his discretion in excluding the juror. 187
The petit jury was thus (improperly) deprived of the input of a qualified juror whose views and beliefs, as a matter of law, in no way disqualified her
from service. 188 And the absence of that perspective in the jury box might
have made a real difference: the defendant was a young black male charged
with a drug distribution offense. 189 But the court’s discussion of these important issues was technically dicta. 190 Because the defendant was convicted
by twelve jurors whose qualifications the defendant did not dispute, his conviction was affirmed. 191

181 . Ross, 487 U.S. at 87–88.
182 . See id . at 86.
183 . See id . at 85–86.
184 . Id . at 88 (“So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to
use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was
violated.”).
185. 116 N.E.3d 609 (Mass. 2019).
186 . Williams, 116 N.E.3d at 612–13.
187 . Id . at 614–19.
188 . Id . at 619.
189 . See id . at 612–13.
190 . Id . at 622.
191 . Id . at 619; accord United States v. Padilla-Mendoza, 157 F.3d 730, 733–34 (9th Cir.
1998) (finding abuse of discretion in excusing jurors for cause who expressed opposition to
drug laws, but affirming conviction for lack of prejudice); see also United States v. Brooks, 175
F.3d 605, 606 (8th Cir. 1999) (same). But see Mason v. United States, 170 A.3d 182, 190 (D.C.
2017) (ordering new trial on similar facts).
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Erroneous Denials of (Defendants’) Challenges for Cause

An erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause might also receive appellate scrutiny when the trial court rejects a meritorious request by the defendant to exclude a juror. Again, however, the Court has made it nearly
impossible for a defendant to obtain relief in such circumstances.
In Ross v . Oklahoma, 192 the Court considered the mirror image of the
problem posed in Gray: the trial court improperly rejected the defendant’s
meritorious challenge for cause to a juror in a capital case. During voir dire,
the prospective juror revealed that he would automatically impose death if
the defendant were found guilty, 193 rendering him automatically excludable. 194 Meritorious challenge for cause denied, the defendant then exercised a
peremptory strike against the juror. 195 This strike was effectively required
under Oklahoma law: a defendant waives her right to complain of an improperly denied challenge for cause if she fails to use an available peremptory strike against the juror. 196 (A similar requirement exists in most
jurisdictions. 197) But the Court upheld the conviction and death sentence. By
striking the biased juror, the Court reasoned, the defendant had cured any
Sixth Amendment violation: twelve impartial jurors heard his case, so the
defendant was not deprived of his right to an impartial jury. 198 Nor did the
effective taxing of the peremptory strike constitute a denial of due process.
“[P]eremptory challenges are a creature of statute and are not required by
the Constitution,” and there was “nothing arbitrary or irrational” about Oklahoma’s requirement that they be exhausted to cure an alleged error on a
challenge for cause. 199 Thus, the defendant, having received exactly what
state law provided he was entitled to, could not complain.
Twelve years later, in United States v . Martinez-Salazar, 200 the Court answered a question left open in Ross: whether the same result would obtain if
the governing rules did not require a curative peremptory. Even after Ross,
most federal courts had continued to follow an “automatic reversal” rule
when a defendant’s challenge for cause was erroneously denied. 201 The Fed-

192. 487 U.S. 81 (1988).
193 . Ross, 487 U.S. at 83–84.
194. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
195 . Ross, 487 U.S. at 84.
196. William G. Childs, The Intersection of Peremptory Challenges, Challenges for Cause,
and Harmless Error, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 49, 55 n.27 (1999).
197. William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Jury Selection Errors on Appeal, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1391, 1398 (2001); accord Childs, supra note 196, at 55 n.27.
198 . Ross, 487 U.S. at 86.
199 . Id . at 89–90.
200. 528 U.S. 304 (2000).
201. United States v. Polichemi, 201 F.3d 858, 862 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v.
Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 408 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 146 F.3d 653 (9th
Cir. 1998); United States v. Cambara, 902 F.2d 144, 147 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Ruus-
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eral Rules of Criminal Procedure lacked a “curative peremptory” requirement akin to Oklahoma’s waiver rule, these courts noted, and without such a
requirement a defendant was constitutionally “entitled to use his peremptory
challenges solely to strike those jurors who would not otherwise be excused
for cause.” 202 In Martinez-Salazar, the Court disagreed. Whether the defendant was deprived of his peremptory by operation of statute or by choice was
irrelevant; by voluntarily electing to strike the juror, the defendant had remedied the constitutional problem on his own. 203 Having eliminated the biased juror, the Court held, the defendant “cannot tenably assert any violation
of his Fifth Amendment right to due process.” 204 If the defendant wanted to
contest the mistaken ruling on his challenge for cause, he “had the option of
letting [the biased juror] sit on the petit jury and, upon conviction, pursuing
a Sixth Amendment challenge on appeal.” 205 This was a hard choice, the
Court conceded, but “[a] hard choice is not the same as no choice.” 206
In practice, though, strategically leaving a biased juror on a petit jury is
almost unthinkable. As the Seventh Circuit wrote in a case reheard immediately after Martinez-Salazar was announced: “[W]e suspect that prudent defense counsel will continue to use peremptory challenges to protect their
clients against potentially biased jurors, rather than gambling everything on
their ability to show bias after-the-fact and to obtain a reversal of a conviction on this basis.” 207 And, as other scholars have noted, the rule has the curious effect of “invit[ing] defense lawyers . . . to intentionally infect the jury
with a biased juror,” an approach arguably in tension with “ethical duties
that even criminal defense lawyers owe to the integrity of the judicial system.” 208 In short, in all but the most unusual cases, the Court has shut the
door on defendants’ ability to contest either the erroneous grant or the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause.
*

*

*

It is not difficult to imagine a very different set of constitutional rules
regulating challenges for cause. Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinions in the
cases surveyed in this Part—in particular Lockhart v . McCree, 209 Holland v .
Illinois, 210 Wilkerson v . Texas, 211 and Ross v . Oklahoma 212—sketch such a

ka, 883 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Ricks, 776 F.2d 455, 461 (4th Cir. 1985);
and United States v. Hill, 738 F.2d 152, 153–54 (6th Cir. 1984)).
202 . Martinez-Salazar, 146 F.3d at 658.
203 . Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 307.
204 . Id . at 317.
205 . Id . at 315.
206 . Id .
207. United States v. Polichemi, 219 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2000).
208. Pizzi & Hoffman, supra note 197, at 1405.
209 . See 476 U.S. 162, 184–86 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
210 . See 493 U.S. 474, 490–94 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
211 . See 493 U.S. 924, 924–26 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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doctrinal framework. If the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement applied at the level of the “qualified” venire (as opposed to the level of
the initial venire), for example, Curtis Flowers could have asserted a faircross-section claim once prosecutors’ challenges for cause eliminated a significant share of the black potential jurors initially summoned to his Mississippi courthouse.213 If the Court adopted a more robust approach to
investigating and evaluating alleged equal protection violations, challenges
for cause like those advanced in Timothy Foster’s trial—where prosecutors
curiously excluded black potential jurors whose biases seemed to favor the
State214—might give rise to constitutional claims.215 And if erroneous rulings
on challenges for cause required automatic reversal, it seems likely that both
attorneys and judges would treat the matter with far greater care than they
do now.216 Taken together, such changes might go a long way toward eliminating the disparities identified in Part I of this Article.
But that is not the path the Court pursued. In 1987, the Court warned
that it was imperative not to “insulate jury selection error from meaningful
appellate review.”217 By 2000, the Court had accomplished precisely that.

212. See 487 U.S. 81, 91–92 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
213. Admittedly, ensuring that challenges for cause produced representative pools of
“qualified” jurors would present some practical difficulties. Perhaps the trial court could continue qualifying nonwhite potential jurors until some semblance of representativeness was restored; in other contexts, though, the Court has explained that such “outright racial
balancing . . . is patently unconstitutional,” Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). Alternatively, the trial court could discharge the venire and begin again with a new slate of prospective jurors; in many cases, though, it seems likely that the same pattern would simply recur
once the parties began qualifying the next batch of potential jurors.
214. See Voir Dire Transcript, supra note 76, at 782.
215. When a Batson violation is found at the trial court level, the typical remedy is to seat
the improperly stricken juror; for obvious reasons, seating a biased potential juror would not
be an attractive remedy for the species of equal protection violation contemplated here. See
Mazzone, supra note 167, at 1619–20. But trial courts have discretion to craft an appropriate
response when they encounter an equal protection violation during jury selection: they may
begin jury selection anew, order the forfeiture of peremptory challenges by the offending party,
grant additional peremptory challenges to the opposing party, or sanction attorneys. Id. at
1618–20, 1624. Each of these remedies would be entirely appropriate if a court found that racial bias unconstitutionally tainted a challenge for cause.
216. Cf. United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 662 (2d Cir. 1946)
(Frank, J., dissenting) (“A legal system is not what it says, but what it does. Our ‘criminal law,’
then, cannot be described accurately in terms merely of substantive prohibitions; the description must also include the methods by which those prohibitions operate in practice—must include, therefore, not the substantive and procedural rules as they appear in words but as they
actually work, or, as Llewellyn puts it, ‘the net operation of the whole official set-up, taken as a
whole,’ for it ‘is that net operation—it is the substantive rule only as it trickles through the
screen of action—which counts in life.’ ” (quoting K.N. Llewellyn, Introduction to JEROME
HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY, at xv, xxiii (1935))).
217. Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 665 (1987).

March 2020]

For Cause

821

III. CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE AND THE ROLES OF THE JURY
Racial disparities equivalent to those identified in Part I have prompted
scholars and jurists to call for reforms in the rules governing peremptory
strikes—or even for the abolition of such strikes altogether. These critiques
vary in their emphasis and perspective, but generally critics highlight the
ways in which peremptory strikes—or prosecutors’ peremptory strikes, in
particular 218—are antithetical to the core functions of the jury. 219 But the
problem goes deeper than most critics have realized: challenges for cause, as
they exist in practice today, raise many similar concerns. Effectively standardless, insulated from meaningful review, and profoundly racially skewed,
our current system of challenges for cause is far more problematic than we
have realized.
This Part repurposes an approach taken by previous scholars of jury selection: it “consider[s] the various roles we expect the jury to fulfill and . . .
ask[s] whether [challenges for cause] hinder or help the jury to fulfill these
roles.” 220 These functions sometimes bleed into one another, and sometimes
they work at cross-purposes, but among those most frequently invoked by
the Supreme Court and scholars are (1) protecting the individual against
governmental overreach; (2) enabling democratic control over the judiciary;
(3) finding facts; (4) bolstering the perceived legitimacy and fairness of criminal verdicts; and (5) serving as a “practical school of free citizenship” 221 (i.e.,
teaching ordinary citizens about their rights and duties). 222 On each front,
challenges for cause—and, particularly, prosecutors’ challenges for cause—
raise grave concerns. Our reflexive ascription of objectivity, legitimacy, and
utility to challenges for cause is unwarranted.

218 . See, e .g ., Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness, supra note 1.
219 . See, e .g ., Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of
the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1045 (1995).
220 . Cf . id . (discussing peremptory challenges). In her appraisal of peremptory strikes,
Professor Marder—to whom this Part owes a significant debt—consolidates some of the
themes I address in Sections III.A and III.B under the heading “The Jury’s Role in Articulating
Public Values.” Id . at 1052–66. I have opted to disaggregate these two ideas for reasons discussed in Section III.B.
Despite the possible tension between these roles, the Court often emphasizes the various
functions of the jury in tandem. The opening paragraph of the Court’s recent opinion in PeñaRodriguez v . Colorado, for instance, touches in rapid succession on four of the five roles discussed in this Part. 137 S. Ct. 855, 860 (2017) (“The jury is a central foundation of our justice
system and our democracy. Whatever its imperfections in a particular case, the jury is a necessary check on governmental power. The jury, over the centuries, has been an inspired, trusted,
and effective instrument for resolving factual disputes and determining ultimate questions of
guilt or innocence in criminal cases. Over the long course its judgments find acceptance in the
community, an acceptance essential to respect for the rule of law. The jury is a tangible implementation of the principle that the law comes from the people.”).
221. FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 236 (Theodore D.
Woolsey ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 3d ed., rev. 1891) (1853).
222 . See, e .g ., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1183–88 (1991).
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The purpose of this exercise is not to advocate for the abolition of challenges for cause (although I am persuaded that alternative models, including
jury selection by lottery, 223 would not be radically inferior to our current regime). Rather, the point is to interrogate more carefully what we want the
jury to accomplish and whether our current system of challenges for cause is
furthering those purposes. Apart from rethinking the constitutional framework governing challenges for cause, as discussed in Part II, this inquiry necessarily forces us to confront an antecedent question: Who should be
“qualified” to participate in the jury system today?
A. Government Overreach
In Duncan v . Louisiana—a case that stemmed from a racially charged
confrontation between white and black teenagers and a locally notorious
segregationist judge 224—the Supreme Court explained that the “right to a jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by
the Government.” 225 The jury, the Framers recognized, was “an inestimable
safeguard” for the individual defendant against the “overzealous prosecutor”
and the “compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.” 226 Fifty years later, in yet another case implicating racial bias within the jury, the Court reaffirmed this
vision of the jury: “Whatever its imperfections in a particular case, the jury is
a necessary check on governmental power.” 227
This understanding of the jury, as “introduc[ing] a slack into the enforcement of law,” 228 extends to its role as a buffer against harsh penal sanctions, including the death penalty. As Blackstone noted in his Commentaries,
English jurors regularly violated their oaths to avoid returning verdicts that
would result in capital punishment; in a trial for grand larceny (“stealing
above the value of twelvepence”), for instance, jurors might value the stolen
item at a lesser amount, notwithstanding clear evidence to the contrary. 229
Such “pious perjury” was evidently commonplace and, in Blackstone’s estimation, altogether proper. 230 Early American juries likewise were familiar

223 . See Amar, supra note 125, at 1287–89 (discussing democratic virtues of lottery regimes, including in the selection of jury venires).
224 . See Nancy J. King, Duncan v. Louisiana: How Bigotry in the Bayou Led to the Federal
Regulation of State Juries, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 261, 261–66 (Carol S. Steiker ed.,
2006).
225. 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).
226 . Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156; accord THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (lauding trial by jury as a check against “arbitrary methods of
prosecuting pretended offenses, and arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions”).
227. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 860 (2017).
228. United States ex rel . McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 776 (2d Cir. 1942) (Hand, J.).
229. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *238–39.
230. Julia Simon-Kerr, Pious Perjury in Scott’s The Heart of Midlothian, in SUBVERSION
AND SYMPATHY: GENDER, LAW, AND THE BRITISH NOVEL 101, 104–05 (Martha C. Nussbaum &
Alison L. LaCroix eds., 2013) (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *239).
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with the sanctions that would attach to convictions for various offenses, and
they tailored verdicts accordingly. 231
Whatever the other merits of challenges for cause, they generally harm
(rather than help) the jury in its role as a restraint on excessive state power.
This dynamic is most acute in the capital context, where under Witherspoon
v . Illinois and its progeny prosecutors may exclude “for cause” prospective
jurors who harbor strong opposition to the death penalty. 232 (This rule appears to date to 1820. Justice Joseph Story, riding circuit, authored an opinion endorsing the removal of two Quaker jurors from a capital case on the
grounds their service would “corrupt[] the very sources of justice.” 233) The
result of this rule on modern death penalty cases is “well documented and
profound”: juries empaneled after the “death qualification” process “are, on
the whole, uncommonly conviction- and death-prone, as well as disproportionately punitive and inclined toward believing the prosecution.” 234

231 . See generally United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (Weinstein, J.) (providing lengthy overview of colonial-era practices regarding nullification and sentencing).
232. 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 419–20
(1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
233. United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 650, 655–56 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 14,865a)
(“To compel a Quaker to sit as a juror on such cases, is to compel him to decide against his
conscience, or to commit a solemn perjury. Each of these alternatives is equally repugnant to
the principles of justice and common sense. To insist on a juror’s sitting in a cause when he
acknowledges himself to be under influences, no matter whether they arise from interest, from
prejudices, or from religious opinions, which will prevent him from giving a true verdict according to law and evidence, would be to subvert the objects of a trial by jury, and to bring into
disgrace and contempt, the proceedings of courts of justice. We do not sit here to procure the
verdicts of partial and prejudiced men; but of men, honest and indifferent in causes. This is the
administration of justice which the law requires of us; and I am not bold enough to introduce a
practice, which corrupts the very sources of justice.”). See generally Cohen & Smith, supra note
12, at 93 (detailing development of death qualification of American juries).
234. Cover, supra note 36, at 121. Capital defendants receive the reciprocal benefit of excluding “automatic death” jurors (i.e., those unwilling to impose a life sentence, rather than
death, if they conclude the defendant is guilty), see Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992), but
this advantage is relatively modest. First, because most jurisdictions require a unanimous recommendation of death to impose a capital sentence, the empanelment of a single “Witherspoon-excludable” juror (whose opinion, standing alone, could block a death
recommendation) would greatly benefit a capital defendant; the defendant’s ability to exclude a
single “automatic death” juror achieves comparatively little, insofar as that juror would still
have to convince eleven fellow jurors that her support for the death penalty was warranted to
alter the outcome. See Cover, supra note 36, at 122. Second, the segment of the general population rendered ineligible under Morgan is smaller than the segment of the general population
rendered ineligible under Witherspoon: there are simply more people with scruples against
capital punishment than those “who believe[] literally in the Biblical admonition ‘an eye for an
eye.’ ” Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 49 (1980). And third, even with Morgan in place, studies
have shown that a significant number of “automatic death” jurors still make it into the jury
box. Cover, supra note 36, at 122 (citing John H. Blume et al., Probing “Life Qualification”
Through Expanded Voir Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1209, 1212 & n.8 (2001), and William J.
Bowers & Wanda D. Foglia, Still Singularly Agonizing: Law’s Failure to Purge Arbitrariness
from Capital Sentencing, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 51, 62–63 (2003)). Thus, the “cumulative impact of
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But the distorting effects of challenges for cause extend to noncapital
cases as well, wherever prospective jurors may harbor conscientious scruples
against particular enforcement practices or the criminalization of certain
conduct (e.g., drug offenses, nonviolent property offenses). Notably, the
American tradition of excluding jurors “for cause” due to moral objections
to a particular law (or enforcement practice) again has its origins in America’s fraught racial politics: “Slavery, or more specifically challenges to the
slavery regime, marks the first context where [for cause] challenges to jurors
with ‘conscientious scruples’ against a particular law appeared in cases.” 235
A defendant’s challenges for cause do serve as an important “check on
governmental power” in some ways—excluding prospective jurors who automatically credit police witnesses, 236 or expect the defendant to testify, 237 or
disregard the presumption of innocence 238—but, again, the gains must be
placed in context. Direct admissions of bias are rare, 239 and except in extreme situations, the courts have shown reluctance to find “implied bias”
based on a prospective juror’s personal connections with law enforcement or
prosecutors. 240 Moreover, the net “whitewashing” of venires described in
Part I suggests that the overall effect of challenges for cause does not accrue
to the defendant’s benefit, even where defendants aggressively attempt to exclude those perceived as hostile to their side. 241 Finally, to the extent that defendants’ challenges for cause do occasionally serve this function, it is an
argument for preserving the defendant’s ability to raise them; it says nothing
about the merits of the greater share of challenges for cause (i.e., those urged
by prosecutors or suggested by judges). 242

Witherspoon proceedings—even as moderated by Morgan—is to yield juries more death prone
than the communities from which their members were drawn.” Cover, supra note 36, at 123.
235. Cohen & Smith, supra note 12, at 93; cf . Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157
(1879) (holding no error in trial court granting government’s challenges for cause against two
prospective jurors who were Mormon and bigamists in federal prosecution for bigamy).
236 . See, e .g ., United States v. Sithithongtham, 192 F.3d 1119 (8th Cir. 1999); State v.
Draper, 675 S.W.2d 863 (Mo. 1984).
237 . See, e .g ., Overton v. State, 801 So. 2d 877, 888–93 (Fla. 2001); State v. Stewart, 692
S.W.2d 295 (Mo. 1985).
238 . See, e .g ., People v. Bludson, 761 N.E.2d 1016 (N.Y. 2001); Green v. Commonwealth,
546 S.E.2d 446 (Va. 2001).
239. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 167, § 22.3(c) (“Direct admissions of bias, however, are
not frequently made; it is ‘unlikely that a prejudiced juror would recognize his own personal
prejudice—or knowing it, would admit it.’ ” (quoting ALFRED FRIENDLY & RONALD L.
GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY 103 (1967))).
240. In Smith v . Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), for example, the Supreme Court affirmed a
defendant’s murder conviction where a juror submitted a job application to the prosecutors’
office midtrial (and prosecutors were aware of this fact). See also United States v. Mitchell, 690
F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding no implied bias where juror was coworker of key government
witnesses).
241 . See supra Sections I.A and I.B.
242 . Cf . Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness, supra note 1 (arguing for the asymmetrical allocation of peremptory strikes).
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B. Democratic Control
Apart from any potential benefits to those accused of criminal offenses,
the American jury also constitutes an institution embodying core republican
values, “a political institution . . . [representing] a mode of the sovereignty of
the people.” 243 It was this vision of the jury that Thomas Jefferson invoked
when he wrote that
in America . . . it is necessary to introduce people into every department of
government as far as they are capable of exercising it . . . . Were I called upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted in the Legislative or
Judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the legislative. 244

The jurors of whom Jefferson wrote were, of course, almost uniformly
freeholding or taxpaying white men, 245 and (as this Article has attempted to
illustrate) our commitment to the jury as a truly representative institution
remains qualified today. But this democratic conception of the jury—that it
is not just “a valued right of persons accused of crime, [but] also an allocation of political power to the citizenry” 246—enjoys a central place in the
American legal imagination. 247
Even stripped of its traditional prerogative to determine both the facts
and the law, the jury still “defines for the community the duties that its
members owe to each other and the standard of conduct to which a reasona-

243. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 261 (Harvey C. Mansfield &
Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835). While this role of the jury may
frequently overlap with that discussed in Section III.A, it may also conflict. During Reconstruction, for instance, black activists’ efforts to integrate the jury were animated largely by the legal
system’s “failure to protect black victims of white violence.” Forman, supra note 19, at 897. The
participation of black jurors was seen as a means of countering the impunity guaranteed by allwhite juries, which regularly acquitted or failed to indict white perpetrators. Id . at 931. But see
Frampton, supra note 3, at 1601–02 (arguing that by the end of the nineteenth century, “securing fair treatment for black defendants” surpassed other concerns—including affirming the
citizenship of black jurors and countering impunity for white purveyors of racial violence—in
organizing efforts against “the Jim Crow jury”).
244. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Abbé Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 595, 595–96 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997); see also Laura I Appleman,
The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L. REV. 397, 398 (2009) (“I go further still,
claiming that even the Sixth Amendment jury trial right, which sounds grammatically like a
right of the accused, is actually a restatement of the collective right in Article III.”); Amar, supra note 125, at 1287–89.
245. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 19, at 877.
246 . Id . at 876.
247 . See, e .g ., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (“[W]ith the exception of voting,
for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to
participate in the democratic process.”). For a more thorough and nuanced examination of
“[t]he ‘juries and democracy’ linkage,” see William Ortman, Chevron for Juries, 36 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1287, 1326–31 (2015) (disentangling related claims associating the jury with democracy).
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ble person is held.” 248 For better or worse, we trust the criminal jury, on behalf of the community it embodies, to “make judgements as to public values” 249 and to articulate and enforce community norms: whether a sexual
encounter was consensual, 250 whether a killing was justified, 251 whether a
politician acted with corrupt intent. 252
Challenges for cause are “antidemocratic” in the same basic way that
“key man” jury selection regimes and peremptory strikes are: they remove
from the jury “a range of values and perspectives,” and if “a range of views is
lost to the jury, then the verdict is less likely to reflect public values.” 253 To be
sure, there may be good reason to police the jury box for such disfavored
values and perspectives; limiting the practice would strike many as reckless
and detrimental to the administration of justice. 254 But it is worth remembering that the relatively recent shift to more democratic “lottery” venires—
now ubiquitous—was no less abhorrent to champions of the “key man” system. 255 Many of the arguments were the same. As Professor Akhil Amar has
written:
[A] tension clearly exists in democratic theory between the conception of
democratic representatives as citizens of moderation and stature—men of
the middle who each represent the soundest instincts and values of the
community—and the conception of representatives as a cross-sectional
group that collectively will be representative of all important subgroups
within the community. 256

248. Marder, supra note 219, at 1058–59.
249 . Id . at 1056.
250 . E .g ., Timothy Williams, What Was Different for Jurors this Time?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
27, 2018, at A19 (examining whether #MeToo movement swayed jury in retrial of Bill Cosby
after initial trial ended in hung jury).
251 . Compare Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin Killing, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2013, at A1, with Mitch Smith, Jurors Believed Their Eyes, Not
Officer’s Words, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2018, at A17 (discussing jury conviction of Chicago police
officer Jason Van Dyke of second-degree murder).
252 . Compare Kim Severson & John Schwartz, Edwards Acquitted on One Count; Mistrial
on 5 Others, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, at A1 (discussing acquittal of John Edwards), with Monica Davey & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Ex-Governor Found Guilty of Corruption, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 2011, at A1 (discussing jury conviction of former governor of Illinois Rod R. Blagojevich).
253 . Cf . Marder, supra note 219, at 1045, 1064 (discussing peremptory strikes).
254 . But see Simonson, supra note 110, at 249 (challenging the premise “that the rules of
criminal procedure must limit direct public participation to an illusory, limited subset of the
public that is deemed ‘neutral’ and ‘unbiased’ ”).
255. VAN DYKE, supra note 111, at 14–15 (discussing opposition to Jury Selection and
Service Act of 1968).
256. Amar, supra note 125, at 1288.
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In the context of the American jury, the latter vision has been ascendant for
the last half century, and few voices today would argue that this radical expansion of jury service in recent decades has been unwise. 257
In this sense, challenges for cause are undemocratic regardless of the racial disparities they reflect or generate—as would be a restriction on electoral
franchise for those with strong partisan views 258—but the data presented in
Part I greatly amplify the core concern. As has already been articulated
across forty-five years of fair-cross-section jurisprudence and countless
scholarly critiques of Batson, large racial disparities in the jury selection process undermine any claim that the criminal jury serves as an authentically
democratic body.
One might counter that challenges for cause, by eliminating extreme
views on both sides, in fact aid the jury in its democratic role, facilitating the
jury’s ability to serve and speak as the true conscience of the community. 259
Put succinctly: “The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed
for them, and not otherwise.” 260 But proponents of this view should
acknowledge that it is (quite literally) the same rationale advanced by the
Court’s majority in Swain v . Alabama and by the dissenters in Batson v . Kentucky.
C. Factfinding
Juries find facts. 261 It is frequently said that factfinding is the primary, or
even sole, role of the jury (“although it is not clear that anyone believes
this”). 262 And there is a longstanding debate as to whether juries are particularly adept at accurately finding facts. 263 Indeed, the jury’s efforts in this re-

257 . But see Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 334 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing the “conclu[sion] that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to a jury that
represents ‘a fair cross section’ of the community . . . seems difficult to square with the Sixth
Amendment’s text and history”).
258. For an analysis of the utility (and limits) of this analogy, see Vikram David Amar,
Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (1995).
259 . Cf . ROBERT W. BENNETT, TAMING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 15 (2006) (“The theory
of the electoral college was that a body of men should be chosen . . . who would be distinguished by their eminent ability and wisdom, who would be independent of popular passion,
who would not be influenced by tumult, cabal, or intrigue, and that in the choice of the President they would be left perfectly free to exercise their judgment in the selection of the proper
person.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 43-395, at 3 (1874))).
260. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 120 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)).
261. For an overview of the debates surrounding the jury as factfinder, see Marder, supra
note 219, at 1066–68.
262. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 116 (1966).
263 . Compare Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 244 (“[The public] are not qualified to judge questions of law; but they are capable of judging questions of fact. In the form of
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gard are impeded by a host of constitutional and subconstitutional rules that
are antagonistic to the “truth-seeking function” of the trial. 264 But, to the extent possible without sacrificing other values, a jury that is more accurate in
its factfinding would seem preferable to one that is less so. Indeed, as Professor Richard Primus has argued in defending the unanimity requirement, jury accuracy (defined there as “the factually correct application of the law to
the case at hand”) may be democratically required. 265
Unquestionably there are many instances where the exclusion of “biased” or “partial” jurors through challenges for cause is consistent with (or
even required by) the factfinding role of the jury. As Chief Justice John Marshall, sitting as circuit judge, explained in the trial of Aaron Burr, “[S]trong
and deep impressions which will close the mind against the testimony that
may be offered in opposition to them, which will combat that testimony, and
resist its force, do constitute a sufficient objection to [a prospective juror].” 266 Were it otherwise, Marshall declared, the constitutional guarantee of
an “impartial jury” would mean very little. 267
But the question whether, all told, challenges for cause advance or inhibit the jury’s factfinding role is a different matter. Consider two of the most
frequent bases for excusing jurors for cause: (1) the prospective juror has
some prior association with the defendant, the alleged victim, or likely witnesses (or some other prior knowledge of the allegations), 268 and (2) the prospective juror acknowledges that, for some other reason (e.g., skepticism of
law enforcement, being a victim of a similar crime), she fears she will not be
entirely “fair” or “impartial” if empaneled. 269 There may be good policy reasons for excluding such jurors, particularly when it comes to the public per-

juries they determine all matters of fact . . . . [Though i]t is therefore left to the juries, if they
think the permanent judges are under any bias whatever in any cause, to take upon themselves
to judge the law as well as the fact.”), with Robert J. MacCoun, Comparing Legal Factfinders:
Real and Mock, Amateur and Professional, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511 (2005) (discussing inherent difficulties measuring factfinding ability of juries).
264 . See, e .g ., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
265. Richard A. Primus, When Democracy Is Not Self-Government: Toward a Defense of
the Unanimity Rule for Criminal Juries, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1417, 1424, 1457 (1997).
266. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g).
267 . Id . at 50; cf . Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 425 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In a
criminal-law system in which a single biased juror can prevent a deserved conviction or a deserved acquittal, the importance of [a means of winnowing out possible . . . sympathies and
antagonisms on both sides] should not be minimized.”).
268 . See ABRAMSON, supra note 19, at 45–46.
269 . See, e .g ., C. La Rue Munson, Selecting the Jury, 4 YALE L.J. 173, 184 (1895) (“In a
general way, the proper rule has been well stated in an able note to Commonwealth v . Brown, 9
Am. State Rep. 746: ‘Whenever a juror shows upon his examination that he himself fears that
his deliberations cannot be impartial, or where he expresses a state of feeling from which it appears that his mind is in an improper condition, he will generally be excluded.’ ”); see also
ABRAMSON, supra note 19, at 47 (“Beyond these problems, the Burr standard more or less required judges to take jurors at their word.”).
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ception of the jury trial as fair, 270 but neither category of exclusion, I contend, advances the factfinding role of the jury.
The version of the “impartial jury” that now reigns in American criminal procedure—distant, dispassionate, ignorant of the parties and allegations—contrasts with the “local jury” that predominated (and was
celebrated, particularly in Anti-Federalist writings) at the country’s founding. 271 Though the history of the Sixth Amendment is “scanty,” 272 the heated
debates over vicinage 273 reveal a “vision of jury deliberation enriched by the
ability of local jurors to know the context in which events on trial took
place.” 274 Narrowing the geography from which jurors were drawn, vicinage
proponents argued, aided the factfinding mission of the jury. 275 Local jurors,
for example, would know whether the defendant is “habitually a good or bad
man”; such knowledge might be dispositive if the case turned on whether the
defendant performed a deed “maliciously or accidentally.” 276 Jurors of the
vicinage would also be acquainted with the character and reliability of the
alleged victim and potential witnesses. 277 They might even have useful
knowledge of the incident itself, “which would permit them to evaluate better the testimony concerning the incident given at the trial.” 278 And, if not,
those closest to the alleged wrongdoing were still best suited to interpret “the
mannerisms, colloquialisms, and fashions of the participants, as well as the
names of roads, locations, and businesses constituting the setting in which
the incident occurred.” 279

270 . See infra Section III.D.
271. ABRAMSON, supra note 19, at 17–55.
272. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 409 (1972).
273 . See generally Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage (pts. 1–4), 29 OKLA. L. REV. 801 (1976), 30
OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1977).
274. ABRAMSON, supra note 19, at 22.
275 . Id . at 27; Kershen, supra note 273, at 75–79.
276 . See ABRAMSON, supra note 19, at 27 (quoting Agrippa, Letter V (Dec. 11, 1787), in 4
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 78 (Herbert Storing ed., 1981)); see also Patrick Henry, Address at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 14, 1788), in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 244, at 434, 435 (“[P]erson[s] accused may be carried from one extremity of the
state to another, and be tried, not by an impartial jury of the vicinage, acquainted with his character and the circumstances of the fact, but by a jury unacquainted with both . . . .” (emphasis
added)). But see Christopher Gore, Address at the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (Jan.
30, 1788), in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 244, at 419, 421 (“The great object is
to determine on the real merits of the cause, uninfluenced by any personal considerations; if
therefore, the jury could be perfectly ignorant of the person in trial, a just decision would be
more probable.”).
277. Kershen, supra note 273, at 834; see also ABRAMSON, supra note 19, at 28 (quoting
James Wilson: “When jurors can be acquainted with the characters of the parties and witnesses . . . they not only hear the words, but they see and mark the features of the countenance; they
can judge of weight due to such testimony.”).
278. Kershen, supra note 273, at 834; see also ABRAMSON, supra note 19, at 28.
279. Kershen, supra note 273, at 834; see also ABRAMSON, supra note 19, at 28. To be
sure, much of the Anti-Federalists’ regard for local juries, and their opponents’ ambivalence,
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At Burr’s trial, this “local knowledge” model of the jury collided with a
much different (and, today, more familiar) model, in which the jurors’ distance from the events assured impartiality. Marshall’s opinion rejected the
“local knowledge” model and “outlined the portrait of the impartial juror we
still try to sketch today.” 280 But even Marshall was unwilling to reject entirely
the common law rule, then still widely accepted, that a potential juror could
serve despite having formed opinions about the case based on the juror’s
personal knowledge of events. 281 “Impartiality” was a critical value, to be
sure, but there was still broad adherence to the view that jurors’ “personal
knowledge about the criminal case [was] an attribute, not a defect, of the jury.” 282
The point here is not to rehash or resolve these old debates but simply to
emphasize that a certain form of knowledge is lost through challenges for
cause as they now operate. Few jurors today would be seated if they revealed
during voir dire that, knowing the defendant from work, they would view
skeptically her account of where the missing money went. Or that, living on
the block where the alleged drug transaction took place, they mistrusted the
narcotics officers who claimed to observe a hand-to-hand transaction. Or
that, knowing the victim and her family for many years, they considered it
improbable she would submit a false police report. Excluding these jurors
might be justifiable on other grounds, but it does not necessarily enhance the
factfinding role of the jury; if anything, it deprives the jury of valuable information. 283

went beyond “accurate” factfinding. Both sides candidly admitted as much. See THE COMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 244, at 435–39. At the Virginia Ratifying Convention, defending
Article III’s lack of a vicinage provision, James Madison explained, “If it could have been done
with safety, it would not have been opposed. It might happen that a trial would be impracticable in the country. Suppose a rebellion in a whole district; would it not be impossible to get a
jury?” Id . at 435–36. Patrick Henry answered, “This gives me comfort—that, as long as I have
existence, my neighbors will protect me. Old as I am, it is probable I may yet have the appellation of rebel.” Id . at 438.
280. ABRAMSON, supra note 19, at 42.
281 . See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 52 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g) (“Without determining whether the case put by Hawk. bk. 2, c. 43, § 28, be law or not, it is sufficient
to observe that this case is totally different. The opinion which is there declared to constitute
no cause of challenge is one formed by the juror on his own knowledge; in this case the opinion is formed on report and newspaper publications.”); see also ABRAMSON, supra note 19, at
42–43 (“Marshall was careful to stress that a person did not lose his ability to be an impartial
juror simply because he had read the papers.”).
282. Kershen, supra note 273, at 77.
283 . Cf . Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 777 (1998)
(arguing for abandonment of existing character evidence rules). But cf . Eleanor Swift, One
Hundred Years of Evidence Law Reform: Thayer’s Triumph, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2437, 2475–76
(2000) (“A basic principle of our criminal law is that persons be judged for their acts, not for
their personalities or their membership in discrete, identifiable groups. Evidence law’s ban on
character evidence [supports] . . . the moral norms that underlie our system of criminal justice.
The harm done to the liberal ideal of judging the act, not the actor, cannot be calculated on a
case-by-case basis, or factored into the balancing process of probative value versus prejudice.
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Relatedly, the challenge-for-cause process today is dominated by prospective jurors’ self-assessments of their own biases. 284 Only in the rarest of
cases will appellate courts find that it was improper to seat a juror who confidently asserted she would try the case fairly and impartially; 285 I have found
no reported case finding error by a trial court in excusing a juror who
acknowledged doubts about her fairness and impartiality. This approach
may be sound, but it is equally plausible that juror confidence acts as a heuristic for judges that is unrelated to the jurors’ actual ability to accurately
find facts. 286 Perhaps the familiar ritual even has a perverse effect: those who
are most conscientious in interrogating their own biases (and, thus, the most
capable factfinders) are eliminated, while those most blind to their own biases (and, thus, the least capable factfinders) are empaneled. 287
The limited experimental research conducted in this field lends support
to the hypothesis. In one study on voir dire, researchers exposed mock jurors
to various forms of prejudicial pretrial publicity; asked questions to assess
whether they could serve as fair and impartial jurors; and, finally, recorded
the jurors’ “verdicts.” 288 The results came as a surprise: juror’s selfassessments of their own bias (i.e., whether they had formed an opinion that
they strongly doubted they could set aside) were largely independent of their
final verdict preferences. 289 In another study, researchers presented judges
and laypeople with experimental vignettes setting forth criminal allegations,
a prospective juror’s biography, and that prospective juror’s self-assessed
impartiality. 290 The vignettes were then modified to reflect differing levels of
confidence in the juror’s self-reported impartiality (e.g., “I’m pretty sure I
could be fair” versus “Yes, yes I can”), and the respondents were asked to assess whether the prospective juror should be excused. 291 Judges’ assessments
of bias closely tracked the prospective juror’s level of confidence, while the
changes in self-confidence were effectively meaningless to the lay respondBright-line rules excluding character to prove conduct can instantiate and send a message
about these moral norms.”).
284. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 15, at 94; Rose & Diamond, supra note 15, at 515.
285 . See Mary R. Rose, A Dutiful Voice: Justice in the Distribution of Jury Service, 39 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 601, 607 (2005) (observing that no prospective juror who stated he or she would
be fair was dismissed for cause in study of thirteen felony trials).
286 . Cf . Siegfried Ludwig Sporer et al., Choosing, Confidence, and Accuracy: A MetaAnalysis of the Confidence–Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness Identification Studies, 118
PSYCHOL. BULL. 315 (1995) (noting limited correlation between confidence and accuracy in
eyewitness identifications).
287. Cynthia Lee, Awareness as a First Step Toward Overcoming Implicit Bias, in
ENHANCING JUSTICE: REDUCING BIAS 289 (Sarah E. Redfield ed., 2017). See generally Anna
Roberts, (Re)Forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L.
REV. 827 (2012) (arguing that juror education on implicit bias can ameliorate its harms).
288. Norbert L. Kerr et al., On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity: An Empirical Study, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 665, 668–69 (1991).
289 . Id . at 695.
290. Rose & Diamond, supra note 15, at 519–20.
291 . Id . at 522–24.
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ents.292 Such results are disquieting in light of previous work by legal anthropologists and other scholars, who have documented that “those with less education and lower occupational status[] are more prone to ‘powerless
language’ ” than others.293 Taken together, the two studies undermine our
dominant approach to identifying jurors who would make bad factfinders:
self-reporting appears to be (at best) meaningless, and rulings on challenges
for cause may be skewed by judges’ class, race, sex, and status biases.294
Finally, juries find facts collectively: we hope (and there is some reason
to believe) that deliberation has a “curative effect” on the biases all jurors
bring into jury room.295 Indeed, much of the Court’s fair-cross-section jurisprudence is premised on the idea that “[w]hen any large and identifiable
segment of the community is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human
experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable.”296 The
product is a “diffused impartiality,”297 where a diversity of perspectives ensures that the relevant facts “will be carefully and critically examined.”298
And to the extent challenges for cause have the effect of rendering petit juries more racially homogenous—which we know they do—there is strong
evidence that such exclusions significantly undermine the accuracy of the
jury’s factual determinations.299

292. Id. at 538.
293. Id. at 541.
294. In this regard, it is notable that at common law, challenges for cause involving
“probable circumstances of suspicion, as acquaintance, and the like,” were not determined by
the judge. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *363. Rather, such challenges
must be left to the determination of triors, whose office it is to decide whether the juror
be favourable or unfavourable. The triors, in case the first man called be challenged, are
two indifferent persons named by the court; and, if they try one man and find him indifferent, he shall be sworn; and then he and the two triors shall try the next; and when
another is found indifferent and sworn, the two triors shall be superseded, and the two
first sworn on the jury shall try the rest.

Id.
295. Hoffman, supra note 9, at 858 (“Our system of peremptory challenges, on the other
hand, substantially devalues both the ability of jurors to set those biases aside and the curative
effect of deliberation.”).
296. E.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 532 n.12 (1975) (quoting Peters v. Kiff, 407
U.S. 493, 503 (1972)); see also Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory
Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV.
491, 531 (1978) (“All jurors’ experiences have shaped their values and attitudes, and these, in
turn, are likely to shape jurors’ perceptions of the trial evidence and hence their votes. In this
sense, ‘prejudice’ is not only ineradicable but often indistinguishable from the very values and
attitudes of the community that we expect the jurors to bring to the trial.”).
297. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
298. Marder, Justice Stevens, supra note 1, at 1725.
299. See Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness, supra note 1, at 1523 (“A reduction in jury diversity is a significant loss, not least because diversity appears to enhance a jury’s effectiveness
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D. Legitimacy
Another critical feature of our jury system, distinct from its actual fairness, is the perception of the jury as an instrument for impartial justice.
Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the jury system is both “dependent on the public’s trust” 300 and a mechanism for maintaining “public
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.” 301 Fostering “acceptance
in the community” of the jury’s verdict is thought “essential to respect for
the rule of law.” 302 “[C]onfidence in jury verdicts,” the Court recently wrote,
“is a central premise of the Sixth Amendment trial right.” 303 Indeed, particularly in its Batson jurisprudence, the Court has placed the perception of fairness alongside actual fairness as a paramount interest. Allowing bias to infect
the jury selection process “invites cynicism respecting the jury’s neutrality
and its obligation to adhere to the law”; 304 it “create[s] the impression that
the judicial system has acquiesced in suppressing full participation by one
[group]” and that the “ ‘deck has been stacked’ in favor of one side.” 305
A strong argument for retaining our system of challenges for cause, both
by the defendant and the prosecution, can be grounded in the desirability of
maintaining popular confidence in the jury system. 306 Few would accept as
legitimate an acquittal where the defendant’s mother sat in the jury, or a
conviction where the defendant’s romantic rival did the same. At worst, verdicts that (rightly or wrongly) are perceived as contrary to the evidence can
spark riots or vigilantism. 307 And, because of our longstanding aversion to
postverdict “impeachment” of the jury’s verdict 308—a rule thought essential
in many ways, including imposing some sort of limitation on the operation of bias.”); see also
id . at 1523 n.132 (collecting sources).
300. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 860 (2017).
301. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).
302 . Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 860.
303 . Id . at 869.
304. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 (1991).
305 . See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel . T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994); see also Tracey L. Meares
& Tom R. Tyler, Justice Sotomayor and the Jurisprudence of Procedural Justice, 123 YALE. L.J.F.
525, 526–27 (2014) (“[T]he primary factor that people consider when they are deciding whether they feel a decision is legitimate and ought to be accepted is whether or not they believe that
the authorities involved made their decision through a fair procedure, irrespective of whether
members of the public are evaluating decisions made by the Supreme Court or by local courts,
or reacting to the decisions made or rules enacted by any legal authorities. Research clearly
shows that procedural justice matters more than whether or not people agree with a decision
or regard it as substantively fair.”).
306 . Cf . Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 50 (1992) (“Just as public confidence in criminal justice is undermined by a conviction in a trial where racial discrimination has occurred in
jury selection, so is public confidence undermined where a defendant, assisted by racially discriminatory peremptory strikes, obtains an acquittal.”).
307 . See, e .g ., ABRAMSON, supra note 19, at 103–04.
308 . See FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1) (“During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during
the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any
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to protecting the integrity and independence of juries—identifying and eliminating juror bias during voir dire assumes significant import. 309
But against this undeniable benefit must be weighed the delegitimizing
force of how challenges for cause are currently conducted. Some of these critiques are old. Mark Twain, in 1872, pilloried the manner in which upstanding community leaders were disqualified from serving as jurors because they
had read newspaper coverage of a crime: “[T]he [jury selection] system rigidly excludes honest men and men of brains . . . . Ignoramuses alone [are entrusted to] mete out unsullied justice.” 310 A century later, Judge John Sirica
famously made a similar point during Watergate. Questioning prospective
jurors, Judge Sirica was astonished when “a handful [of prospective jurors]
indicated they had not heard of the scandal”; he “indicated that those persons ought perhaps to be the least qualified to sit on the jury.” 311 There are
nontrivial legitimacy costs to be paid for empaneling the form of “unbiased”
jurors to which we have become accustomed.
The graver concern, though—which has not been recognized previously—stems from the racial disparities identified in Part I. As presently constituted, challenges for cause (and, specifically, prosecutors’ challenges for
cause) systemically reduce the representation of nonwhite jurors on petit juries. They do so to an even greater extent than peremptory strikes. 312 Whether or not these disparities alter any given verdict, and whether or not they
stem from overt “racial bias” (as understood in the Batson sense), we know
from decades of scholarship that unrepresentative juries “threaten the public’s faith in the . . . legal system and its outcomes.” 313 If there is a danger that
juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may not receive a
juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters.”); Tanner v. United States,
483 U.S. 107, 120–21 (1987). But see Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869 (“[T]he Court now holds
that where a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes
or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the noimpeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the
juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.”).
309 . See Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power,” 27 STAN. L.
REV. 545, 551 (1975); see also Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526–27 (1973) (emphasizing importance of voir dire in identifying and eliminating racial bias). But see Barbara Allen
Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women’s Rights and Jury Service, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1139,
1147 (1993) (“What I failed to recognize . . . was that, even though no words were spoken, tides
of racial passion swept through the courtroom when the peremptory challenges were exercised.”).
310. MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 341–42 (Shelley Fisher Fishkin ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1996) (1872); see also Saturday Night Live, Season 34, Ep . 2 (“OJ Jury Selection”) (NBC television broadcast Sept. 20, 2008) (“DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Juror No. 4? JUROR NO. 4: [barking]. PROF. DAVENPORT: Perhaps I can explain. . . . I just discovered this woman in the
Arctic tundra. She was raised by wolves and has no knowledge of human language or culture.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Excellent.”).
311. VAN DYKE, supra note 111, at 143–44.
312 . See supra Sections I.A and I.B.
313. Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: Battering and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1033, 1038 (2003); see also Nancy J.
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peremptory strikes undermine public confidence in the fairness of jury adjudication by altering the jury’s overall racial composition, the same danger
exists with respect to challenges for cause.
In some ways, the legitimacy harms stemming from racial disparities in
the government’s challenges for cause may be even greater than those harms
inflicted by commensurate disparities in the government’s peremptory
strikes. Both categories of exclusions seem predicated on “the widely held
belief that, at least in certain types of cases, a juror’s [group characteristic]
has some statistically significant predictive value as to how the juror will behave.” 314 Such conduct is pernicious and constitutionally impermissible—
though perhaps not altogether irrational 315—in large part due to the harmful
lesson it communicates to excluded jurors and the public. 316 But challenges
for cause differ from peremptory strikes insofar as they delimit, on a more
fundamental level, who has the legal capacity to participate in the administration of law as a juror in the first instance. When the government pursues
one racial group for legal disqualification with such disparate vigor, the insult is more profound: it is, as the Supreme Court said in 1880, “practically a
brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a
stimulant to [further] race prejudice.” 317 There would be widespread indignation (one would hope) if an elected official announced, “In general, our
black citizens are simply much less qualified than our white citizens to be jurors.” Yet this is the precise message that prosecutors and judges communicate on a daily basis when raising and ruling upon challenges for cause.
It might be answered that this claim (that challenges for cause undermine perceptions of fairness by eliminating minority jurors) is undercut by
the relative obscurity of the problem—how could challenges for cause be a
source of public disillusionment if we are only just noticing that they are
problematic? I suspect that, on the ground, the issue is not invisible. Consider the trial of Curtis Flowers, wherein challenges for cause significantly reduced the percentage of black prospective jurors. 318 Immediately before
peremptory strikes began, Flowers’s lawyer raised a concern: “Your Honor,
we are dealing with a venire [after challenges for cause] that is [now] so blaringly disproportionate to the population of this county.” 319 The trial court

King, The Effects of Race-Conscious Jury Selection on Public Confidence in the Fairness of Jury
Proceedings: An Empirical Puzzle, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1177, 1181, 1182–85 (1994) (“Existing
research confirms that . . . racially representative juries[ ]can enhance perceptions of jury fairness.”).
314. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel . T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 157 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
315 . See Frampton, supra note 3, at 1635–39 (documenting racial disparities in jurors’
votes in nonunanimous verdicts).
316. Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right
Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 742–50 (1992).
317. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
318 . See supra Section I.C.1.
319. Voir Dire Transcript, supra note 52, at 1736.
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patiently explained that there was no legal infirmity in the “whitewashing” of
the venire:
You have got to look into the purpose, the reason. And the reason why is
because Mr. Flowers has a number of brothers and sisters. His parents are
well-known. [Curtis’s father] Mr. Archie Flowers is apparently one of the
most well-thought of people in this community.
. . . Mr. Flowers [has the right] to be tried in his home county. . . . But he
cannot then come around and complain because people are excused because they know him.
. . . [I]f there is a statistical abnormality now, it is because almost every African-American that has been excused for cause, other than those on the
death question, were because they knew him.
....
So you know, there is—nothing the State has done has caused this statistical
abnormality.
. . . It is strictly because of the prominence of his family. 320

This account probably persuaded few black onlookers of the fairness of the
proceedings when the (nearly all-white) jury returned its recommendation
of death.
E. Education
Finally, the jury is thought to “play[] an important role as educator of
the citizenry in the lessons of democracy.” 321 In the early republic, “[j]ury
service came to be viewed as an educational opportunity, whereby each citizen learned the workings of the law and received training in the pursuit of
justice.” 322 Jury service promised “crucial civic education and moral transformation [for] the common man.” 323 Alexis de Tocqueville described the
jury as a “school, free of charge and always open, where each juror comes to
be instructed in his rights, where he enters into daily communication with
the most instructed and most enlightened members of the elevated classes.” 324 Whether or not it benefited the immediate parties to the litigation,
the jury was still “one of the most efficacious means for the education of the

320 . Id . at 1736–39.
321. Marder, supra note 219, at 1083.
322. Benjamin Justice & Tracey L. Meares, How the Criminal Justice System Educates Citizens, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 159, 167 (2014); accord THE FEDERAL FARMER,
NO. 4 (Oct. 12, 1787), in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 244, at 446, 447 (describing trial by jury as the “fortunate invention[]” that allows “common people . . . to acquire information and knowledge in the affairs and government of the society”).
323. ABRAMSON, supra note 19, at 32–33.
324. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 243, at 262.
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people which society can employ.” 325 These perceived benefits of the jury are
still regularly invoked by scholars 326 and by the Court. 327
It would be a mistake, I think, to dismiss such sentiments as antiquated
or patronizing. There are precious few institutions in American democracy
that compel private individuals to engage meaningfully with those from different racial or socioeconomic backgrounds; there are fewer still that ask
those assembled individuals to seek consensus.
But jury service also teaches less salubrious lessons, which challenges for
cause compound. As Professors Benjamin Justice and Tracey L. Meares have
argued, “the jury system offers an empty symbol of civic education at best,
and a consistently racist civic education at worst.” 328 Disproportionate exclusions of various groups “send[] a clear message that some people are worthy
citizens whose opinions and judgments are valued, while other citizens’
views do not count.” 329
The widespread (and understudied) exclusion from jury service of one
class of “presumptively biased” prospective jurors, persons convicted of
criminal offenses, offers a paradigmatic example. 330 To the extent our commitment to the jury system stems from a faith in the “civic education and
moral transformation” such participation provides, certainly these individuals (and others who disclose strong potential biases outside of the community’s norms) should be leading candidates for such tutelage. Yet every state
except for Maine and Colorado limits jury participation for those convicted
of felonies in some way, and twenty-eight states impose complete bans. 331
Thirteen states disqualify at least some potential jurors based on misdemeanor convictions. 332 The sole empirical study examining the pretrial biases of this group, however, reveals that levels of pro-defense and anti-

325. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (quoting 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 334–37 (Henry Reeve trans., Schocken Books 1961) (1835)).
326. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Jury Instructions as Constitutional Education, 84 U.
COLO. L. REV. 233, 242–73 (2013).
327. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 273 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); Powers, 499
U.S. at 407.
328. Justice & Meares, supra note 322, at 169.
329 . Id .
330 . See Anna Roberts, Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusions on the Basis of Criminal Convictions, 98 MINN. L. REV. 592 (2013); see also Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury
Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 67 (2003) (“Perhaps more surprising is that scholars have ignored
‘felon exclusion’ despite a mass of legislation and appellate litigation, and despite the glaring
racial disparities.”).
331. James M. Binnall, Summonsing Criminal Desistance: Convicted Felons’ Perspectives
on Jury Service, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 4, 4 (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-71-105(3) (2018)
(excluding convicted felons from serving on grand juries, but not on trial juries). But see Kenneth Lovett, Harlem State Senator’s Bill Would Allow Felons to Serve on Juries After Completing
Their Sentences, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 25, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com
/news/politics/ny-pol-benjamin-parole-felons-juries-20181121-story.html
[https://perma.cc
/NEH3-ACG7].
332. Roberts, supra note 330, at 593.
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prosecution pretrial biases among those convicted of felonies roughly match
those of law students. 333 And recent qualitative research into this group’s experience serving on criminal juries in Maine has found that those convicted
of felonies typically “seek to conform to what they perceive as the state’s expectations of an exemplary juror, and ultimately incorporate the characteristics of the juror role into their own self-concepts.” 334 For many of the study’s
subjects, the experience was validating and transformative, a “recognition of
their reformation.” 335 In short, the jury-as-educator model may have much
to recommend it, if we have the courage to fully embrace it.
*

*

*

The foregoing suggests the advantages that might flow from adopting a
more expansive view of who is “qualified” to serve as a juror (and, correspondingly, sharply limiting the role that challenges for cause play in jury
selection). To be sure, in limited circumstances—particularly when necessary
to ensure the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury—
challenges for cause could continue to play an important role in how juries
are empaneled. But many potential jurors ordinarily excluded from service
should be “qualified” to serve, including many of those familiar with the parties or events in question, those harboring strong views about specific laws or
law enforcement generally, those with prior convictions, and even those who
disclose good-faith reservations about their own partiality. Our jury system
could survive such changes; in many ways, they would make it stronger.
And, perhaps more than any of the doctrinal shifts suggested in Part II, such
changes might reduce the extraordinary racial disparities that presently pervade challenges for cause today.
CONCLUSION
As Justice Sotomayor recently wrote (albeit not in a discussion of challenges for cause), “racial bias is ‘a familiar and recurring evil’ ” afflicting the
American jury; it “can and does seep into the jury system,” often “subtly.” 336
This is a valuable insight, and one that seems to anticipate the limits of even
the most ambitious current proposals for reform (e.g., abolition of peremptory strikes). “The work of ‘purg[ing] racial prejudice from the administration of justice,’ ” she wrote, “is far from done.” 337 In a racially stratified
society, where worldviews, life experiences, and opinions on criminal justice

333. James M. Binnall, A Field Study of the Presumptively Biased: Is There Empirical Support for Excluding Convicted Felons from Jury Service?, 36 LAW & POL’Y 1, 18 (2014).
334. Binnall, supra note 331, at 10.
335 . Id . at 15.
336. Tharpe v. Ford, 139 S. Ct. 911, 913 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari) (quoting Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017)).
337 . Id . (quoting Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 859 (2017)).
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issues are often shaped by race, it should come as little surprise that challenges for cause continue to reflect and reproduce racial hierarchies, too. 338
We are past due for recognizing this phenomenon and developing ways to
structure our jury system to address it.

338 . Cf . Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2218 (2019) (“In a racially stratified world, any method of prediction will project the inequalities of the past into the
future. This is as true of the subjective prediction that has long pervaded criminal justice as it is
of the algorithmic tools now replacing it.”).
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